case of interception and exploitation of the data collected by the UA. All classes of UA are susceptible to non-lethal threats.
While UA have been used in combat since the Vietnam War, combat and non-combat loss data is notably sparse. With the proliferation of militarized UA in the last decade it is likely that a significant portion of the information about UA combat experience is widely dispersed and undocumented. In addition, the limited data that is readily available does not provide insight on subsystem/damage mode contribution to combat loss or characterize the damage inflicted on UA that have returned from combat missions. Data of this type regarding combat damage to manned aircraft since Vietnam have proven invaluable in understanding the vulnerability of the aircraft and mitigating the threat. The systematic collection of equivalent data for unmanned aircraft would be of equal benefit.
SURVIVABILITY AS A SYSTEMS DESIGN DISCIPLINE
DoD systems are intended to accomplish their mission in “a man-made hostile threat environment.” In order to be mission effective, survivability must be considered; survivability becomes one of the design factors in achieving the most mission effective system at the lowest cost.
Is it less costly to procure many inexpensive expendable UA, a few more expensive attritable UA, or even fewer more expensive but more survivable UA? For manned systems, loss of human life is a consideration that pushes the systems to a higher level of survivability. For unmanned systems this is not the case. However, DoD UA still need to be effective and able to accomplish their missions in hostile environments. To achieve that, survivability must be part of the design process. The extent that survivability will be included in a design is dependant on many factors including the mission(s) to be accomplished, the criticality of those mission(s), the threat environment that will be encountered, and the number of assets available taking into account the UA aircraft as well as the payload. To perform a non-critical mission in a low threat environment other aspects of the design (e.g., cost, range, or payload) will take precedence over survivability features. This may also be true if a large number of expendable assets are available to perform the mission. If one or more of the assets are destroyed, the mission can still accomplished at lower life-cycle cost. A more critical mission in a higher threat environment increases the importance of survivability design features. If few assets are available, completing the mission the first time and with a single vehicle may be imperative. It is important to weigh all the factors in determining how “survivable” a UAS must be to fulfill its specified functional capability.
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