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时间:2012-03-16 12:23来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:航空
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The long-term FAA plan is “to move away from infrastructure-based systems towards a more autonomous, aircraft-based system” for collision avoidance6. Installation of TCAS is increasing across the aviation community, and TCAS functionality supports increased operator autonomy.  Research and testing of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) may afford an even greater capability and affirms the intent of the aviation community to support and continue down this path.  Such equipment complements basic S&A, adds to the situational awareness, and helps provide separation from close traffic in all meteorological conditions.
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS
Data Link Security. In general, there are two main areas of concern when considering link security:  inadvertent or hostile interference of the uplink and downlink.  The forward (“up”) link controls the activities of the platform itself and the payload hardware.  This command and control link requires a sufficient degree of security to insure that only authorized agents have access to the control mechanisms of the platform.  The return (“down”) link transmits critical data from the platform payload to the warfighter or analyst on the ground or in the air.  System health and status information must also be delivered to the GCS or UA operator without compromise.
Redundant/Independent Navigation. The air navigation environment is changing, in part, because of the demands of increased traffic flow.  Allowances for deviation from intended flight paths are being reduced. This provides another means for increasing air traffic capacity as airways and standard departures and approaches can be constructed with less separation.  As tolerances for navigational deviation decrease, the need to precisely maintain course grows.  All aircraft must ensure they have robust navigational means.  Historically, this robustness has been achieved by installation of redundant navigational systems.  The need for dependable, precise navigation reinforces the redundancy requirements.
While navigation accuracy and reliability pertain to military operations and traffic management, current systems are achieving the necessary standard without redundancy, and without reliance on ground based navigation aids.  The Federal Radionavigation Plan, signed March 2002, establishes the following national policies:
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Unaugmented, properly certified GPS is approved as a primary system for use in oceanic and remote airspace.

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Properly certified GPS is approved as a supplemental system for domestic en route and terminal navigation, and for non-precision approach and landing operations.

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The FAA’s phase-down plan for ground-based NAVAIDS retains at least a minimum operational network of ground-based NAVAIDS for the foreseeable future.

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Sufficient ground-based NAVAIDS will be maintained to provide the FAA and the airspace users with a safe recovery and sustained operations capability in the event of a disruption in satellite navigation service.
 
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