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more than a series of individual problems with
individual, independent solutions. These concerns are
highly interrelated, and are evidence of aviation system
problems, not just isolated human or machine errors.
Therefore, we need system solutions, not just point
solutions to individual problems. To treat one issue (or
underlying cause) in isolation will ultimately fail to
fundamentally increase the safety of airplane operations,
and may even decrease safety.” Not so very different
from the NTSB quote at around the same time.
Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety & Operation, London, UK
© 2005: Royal Institution of Naval Architects
2. HUMAN SYSTEM INTEGRATION
The HF task force report [4] found a number of
interrelated deficiencies in the current aviation system:
• Insufficient communication and coordination
• Processes used for design, training, and
regulatory functions inadequately address
human performance issues.
• Insufficient criteria, methods, and tools for
design, training, and evaluation.
• Insufficient knowledge and skills.
• Insufficient understanding and consideration of
cultural differences in design, training,
operations, and evaluation.
The report made very extensive recommendations for
change for all of these deficiencies.
Since [4], there has been regulatory activity at a cockpit
and equipment level to address some of the problems of
automated cockpits [5, 6]. The JAA Interim Policy [5] is
part of the certification basis for Airbus 380, Boeing 7E7,
Cessna Citation 680, Dassault EASY, Dornier 728,
Embraer 170/190, Gulfstream G5SP. It was a major input
to the ATOMOS template responses [7] to SOLAS
Regulation V/15 [3].
Since then, EASA has developed draft material for the
Airworthiness Code and an Acceptable Means of
Compliance for Human Factors [6]. This sets out
requirements and Acceptable Means of Compliance so
that installed equipment can be shown, individually and
in combination with other such equipment, to be
designed so that qualified flight crewmembers trained in
its use can safely perform their tasks associated with its
intended function.
Most of the technical material is directly applicable to a
maritime setting. Of regulatory interest is the extensive
Regulatory Impact Assessment, which examines a
number of options (including a ‘do nothing’ option). The
pros and cons of the selected option can be summarised
as follows:
Pros:
• It addresses design characteristics that lead to
error rather than error itself.
• It allows focused discussion on certain aspects
of design characteristics.
• It has explicit ties to the flight crew tasks.
• It is potentially easier to tie to methods of
compliance.
• It allows a more direct basis in the requirements
such as integration and systems behaviour.
Cons:
• The list of characteristics may not be complete,
thus leaving “holes” that an error based
requirement would cover.
• Being based on design characteristics may not
result in applicant taking a better, more
structured, approach to the design process
The split in regulation and standards-setting between
bridge layout and bridge equipment design is more
severe both in structure and in practice than the
comparable split in aviation. Achieving technical
integration from an operator point of view is hindered by
this split. The investment cycle in aviation makes it
possible to do some integration at a cockpit level, but this
is difficult in shipping during design and build. It may be
more readily achieved if the bridge and its topside
(including the antenna farm) is contracted out as a
module, and including a system engineering/integration
role.
Finally, it should be noted that there is a significant rider
to the last point of difference between sectors noted in
the introduction; the aviation industry has yet to come to
terms with training for automation. Indeed, this is a nice
example of a problem at an aviation system level, as
shown in the quote from Wood [8].
“...So at the end of the Type Rating training the pilot is
competent to manage the system in a normal situation
based on declarative knowledge but has little experience
or procedural knowledge of normal operation and even
less in the case of failure, i.e. non-normal situations.”
3. AUTOMATION AND HUMAN ERROR
POTENTIAL
Reising [9] has pointed out the increasing mental
distance between the operator input and the system
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