曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
TWENTY YEARS ON THE WRONG HEADING DEAD AHEAD
B M Sherwood Jones Process Contracting Limited, UK
SUMMARY
“A wise man learns by the mistakes of others, a fool by his own.” Latin Proverb
The aviation community is undergoing a reappraisal of progress made in automated cockpits. This gives the shipping
community the opportunity to learn from someone else’s mistakes and successes. Aviation has invested more heavily in
automation than shipping, and in some respects can be considered to be ‘ahead’. The reappraisal has identified issues at
a number of levels, ranging from decision making by the operator to the structure of the industry. It is recognised that
there are numerous differences between shipping and aviation, and these are taken into account.
This paper identifies potential problems and opportunities for shipping, based on an examination of the state of aviation.
The technical topics considered include equipment design and the design of automation, considering the allocation of
function between the operator and the machine. Similarities in the design and development process are examined, with
lessons for future automation identified. Some aspects related to the human element arise from problems with aviation or
shipping as a system, and require a systems approach for their resolution. These are discussed in the light of recent
aviation findings.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Human Element has long been recognised as
important to marine safety. The work performed by
Lloyd’s Register to address the Human Element has been
described previously [1]. This paper discusses aspects of
the Human Element in relation to the design and
operation of automated bridges. It examines activity in
the aviation sector for relevance to the maritime sector on
two topics: system level issues, or Human System
Integration aspects, and issues associated with
automation and human error potential.
The NTSB Report on the grounding of the ROYAL
MAJESTY [2] stated "Thus, while human engineering is
a known concept in the marine industry, there have not
been any unifying efforts to integrate this concept into
the marine engineering and manufacturing sector.
Additionally, human engineering in the broader context
of Human System Integration has been given little or no
consideration. Consequently, the potential for error
causing behaviour related to these [automated] systems
has not been adequately addressed by the marine
industry". This incident was a major stimulus for recent
changes to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
Regulations [3] that have been introduced for ships with
extensive automation, in particular SOLAS Regulation
V/15 ‘Principles relating to bridge design, design and
arrangement of navigational systems and equipment and
bridge procedures.’
It is recognised that there are significant differences
between the aviation and marine sectors, and that these
differences will affect the respective evolution of the
Human Element. The differences of note are:
• The investment cycle in aviation promotes
greater R&D than that in shipping. It is from
this that shipping can learn Human Element
lessons from aviation.
• The regulatory structure in aviation is simpler
and perhaps more oriented to rich countries with
large aviation industries.
• Pilots receive more training per head than
bridge watchkeepers.
However, the similarities between the sectors are also
striking. On the basis of personal experience the
following are important and form the basis of this paper:
• The difficulty in integrating different aspects of the
Human Element such as changes to automation,
manning levels, training provision, procedures
development, and operating limits. This appears to
be related to divisions in the regulatory structure and
the structure for financial decision making.
• The power of ‘technology push’ – the extent to
which more equipment and automation is promoted
and adopted as the simplest answer to problems of
all sorts. This approach to introducing automation
leads to problems of ‘supervisory control’ where the
human has much responsibility but little to do.
In summary, the evolution in aviation that would appear
to offer lessons for the maritime sector began with a
major review of the interfaces between flightcrews and
modern flight deck systems [4]. This produced extended
conclusions and recommendations. The summary point
was the following: “Based on our investigations and
examination of the evidence, these concerns represent
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