Developing Advanced Crew Resource Management (ACRM) Training: A Training Manual(118)

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Report 05
The problem arose when the Captain (PNF) called "1000' to go" as we passed 8000'. I estimate 20-30 seconds later the Captain suddenly remember to call in our times (out/off) to company. The Captain was unsure of our out/off times and asked me. We both looked at our watches and agreed on the times to be used. Next, the Captain was not sure what company frequency was and asked me. I looked down to retrieve my chart binder to verify the freq. When I looked back up to the panel, we were passing 9300'. I immediately lowered the nose and acknowledged my alt deviation to Captain I began an immediate descent to assigned alt, 9000'. The Captain, who also was looking for frequency to call company and not monitoring the panel either, tried to find the right knob to turn mode c off on transponder, which I had to help him find. I estimate we were at 9300-9400' for 10-15 seconds and never actually level at either. I returned the plane to assigned alt (9000') in about 25-30 seconds. Problem corrected. Being on ready reserve from mid-morning till late evening. The Captain had flown since early morning, and had totaled 7 hours of flying that day. He was tired and appeared to be unfamiliar with aircraft. This made me feel uneasy. Both Captain and I were tired and Captain distracted me and himself when within 1000' of assigned alt. Having been off duty 3 days before the flight caused both scan and judgment to be slowed. I would recommend a strict tolerance to a sterile cockpit anytime climbing or descending within 1000' of an assigned alt; i.e., no paperwork, no calls to company or passengers. Both pilots should be watching the plane and the panel in order to x-check and verify what should be done is being done.
Report 06
Ground control had cleared me to taxi to runway 29. Another company aircraft had been cleared to taxi to runway 34. I misunderstood the controller’s instructions and taxied across runway 11/29. My crew and I arrived at the aircraft 1 hr, 30 minutes late due to crew rest requirements. We were hurrying to get back on schedule. Neither my F/O nor myself are that familiar with the Westchester airport. Contributing factors: rushing to get back on schedule, operating on a new airport, and confusing my taxi instructions with those given to another aircraft. I was advised by ground control that I had taxied across runway 11/29. Lessons learned: 1) don't rush, especially when operating on a new and unfamiliar airport. 2) if you are not sure of instructions, stop and ask. Supplemental information from ACN 140815: as the Captain taxied the aircraft I proceeded with the checklist and setting up the radios. Although not mandated, this is usually accomplished prior to taxiing, but because of the behind schedule situation, we elected to set them up while taxiing. I repeated the taxi instructions to the Captain, he acknowledged. I periodically cleared the area during taxi while accomplishing the checklist and setting of the radios. I went back to my duties prior to the intersection of the taxiway and runway 29. I cleared the area 7-10 seconds later and noticed we had crossed runway 29 and were headed for runway 34.
　
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