曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
requirements of the existing regulatory documents. Air traffic control service personnel,
including personnel from the areas of responsibility in Sochi, Yerevan, Tbilisi and Rostov, had
valid licenses as civil aviation specialists with the required ratings.
11. At the time of the accident the meteorological conditions were complicated
and did not correspond to the meteorological minima of the runway 06 of the Sochi airport due to
the «cloud ceiling» parameter. In the time before the accident, the weather conditions at Sochi
airport were unstable. The crew was informed of the weather changes by the air traffic controller
in a timely manner. Inaccuracies committed by the air traffic controller while reporting the
weather were not directly connected with the cause of the aircraft accident, but they influenced
the initial decision of the crew to return to the departure aerodrome .
12. The emotional reaction of the crew to the air traffic controller’s information
about the actual weather changes below the established meteorological minima was negative and
could have led to an increase in the psycho-emotional strain of the crew members during the final
stage of flight.
13. The approach for a landing on runway 06 was made with the use of ILS in an
automatic mode. There was no deviation of the aircraft from the established glide slope profile.
All the radio navigation aids at Sochi airport were fully serviceable.
14. The tower controller’s instruction to abort the descent and perform a righthand
climbing turn to 600 m that was given to the crew after the cloud ceiling decreased below
the established minima for RW 06, did not fully comply with the provisions of the controller's
operational manual, though it did not directly influence the outcome of the flight. According to
the AIP of Russia the controller had a right to refuse the landing. It should be noted that a number
of AIP items contradict each other and are ambiguous.
15. According to the Armavia Operations Manual, the crew must initiate the goaround
manoeuvre on receiving weather information below the minima, even if the reliable visual
contact is established with the runway or with landmarks.
51
16. At the beginning of the aborted-approach manoeuvre the crew did not comply
with the standard go-around procedure stipulated by the FCOM, regarding applying takeoff
thrust, retracting flaps by one step and retracting landing gear. The climb in the OPEN CLIMB
mode and the right-hand turn in the HDG mode were carried out under autopilot control in the
landing configuration with the autothrust working in the speed-hold mode. The landing gear was
extended until the end of the flight. The mode in question is not described in the A320 AFM.
17. During flight under autopilot control, the LOW ENERGY WARNING signal
was activated. The crew had properly reacted to this warning by setting the thrust levers in the
takeoff position in full compliance with the AFM. It must be noted that the crew actions on
activation of this warning are specified in the ABNORMAL PROCEDURE section of the A320
QRH.
18. Simultaneously with an increase in engine power the crew (the Captain)
switched off the autopilot in the normal manner using the take-over pushbutton on the side stick.
Most probably, the cause of the autopilot disengagement was the fact that the aircraft dynamics
and attitude during this manoeuvre were unexpected by the Captain: pitch angle +21º, roll angle
+25º, decrease in speed, the activated «SPEED SPEED SPEED»,warning as well as the fact that
he could not predict further changes in these parameters. Throughout the rest of the flight the
airplane was controlled manually, with the both FDs switched on.
19. After disengagement of the autopilot the Captain was pilot flying. His actions,
originally, led to the plane making a stabilized turn to the right with a roll of about 20 degrees,
climbing at a rate of 2-3 m/s and accelerating. The stabilized turn proceeded until the magnetic
heading attained the value differing from the runway heading by 90 degrees. Subsequently the
Captain controlled the plane to descend with a pitch angle up to 12 degrees pitch down and a roll
angle up to 40 degrees to the right, which at maximum continuous power resulted in a substantial
increase in IAS and the vertical rate of descent, as well as in activation of EGPWS and CRC
warnings (excessive speed in flight with high-lift devices extended). The actual reason of such
actions by the Captain could not be determined. Probably, such inadequate piloting was caused
by the lack of monitoring of such flight parameters as pitch, altitude and roll, at night in difficult
weather conditions with a background of fatigue and psycho-emotional stress.
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
航空资料30(98)
