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5.3 To the Civil Aviation Administration of the Republic of Armenia and Armavia airline
administration:
- To include in the A320 FCTM the mandatory requirement for trainee Captains to pass the
Upgrade to Captain programme.
- To keep records on approaches performed in difficult weather conditions by A320 crews, in
accordance with the regulatory documents relating to the organization of flight operations in civil
aviation of the Republic of Armenia.
- To organize FDR and CVR readouts for analysis of A320 flight operations, in order to reveal
any errors and deficiencies in crews’ piloting technique, and to develop measures for their
prevention.
- To point out to aircraft crews that irrelevant conversations in the cockpit, especially during the
climb and descent phases, are prohibited.
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- To consider the necessity of enhanced simulator training for A320 crews.
- To develop a procedure for storage of A320 operational documentation that would regulate the
conditions of keeping the originals and copies of the documents by both Sabena Technics and
Armavia airline.
5.4. To the Federal Air Navigation Service of the Russian Federation:
- To review the possibility of updating of AIP of the RF and other regulatory documents for the
purpose of unification of ATC procedures for issuing instructions for go-arounds to aircraft
operated by domestic and foreign airlines, and to incorporate the relevant amendments into the
Rules and Phraseology for In-flight Radio Communications and ATC.
- To review the possibility of incorporation of the Air Traffic Service procedures in the
aerodrome services provided in accordance with ICAO recommendations (Document 4444,
Attachment 11) and the Order No. 103/DV-116 of 26.10.95 issued by Department of Air
Transport.
5.5. To the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring:
- To review the possibility of purchasing and installing of a new Doppler weather radar at the
civil aviation meteorological station in Sochi.
- To undertake measures to eliminate the shortcomings in the meteorological support to civil
flight operations at Sochi aerodrome brought to light in the course of the investigation.
5.6. To the federal state unitary enterprise “State Corporation for Air Traffic Management»:
- To restore complete ATIS broadcasting for Sochi aerodrome, including weather data.
- To clarify to controllers of the Sochi Air Traffic Support of the groups of BECMG and TEMPO
changes in the weather forecasts for the aerodrome and of the two-hour “trend” weather
forecasts.
5.7. To Airbus:
- To eliminate the discrepancies in the documentation describing the logic of the binary signals
recorded by the FDR.
- To introduce in the A320 FCOM information clarifying specific features of activation of the
OPEN CLIMB mode in various flight conditions.
- To introduce in the A320 FCOM a warning about possible activation of the LOW ENERGY
WARNING, when the aircraft performs manoeuvres in the landing configuration with
considerable changes in pitch and roll angles.
- To review the expediency of alteration of the type and/or priority of the EGPWS warning to
ensure more reliable pilots’ response to its activation.
5.8. To eliminate the shortcomings revealed during investigation of the aviation accident.
Chairman of the Investigation Commission L.A Kashirsky
Deputy chairmen G.M. Galstyan
A.N. Morozov
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Commission members :
N.F. Zobov
Y.V. Fedyushin
S.N. Pogrebnov
E.P. Glukhovskaya
N.N.Chubarov
INTERSTATE AVIATION COMMITTEE
- 1 -
ACCIDENT TO FLIGHT RNV967
BEA COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FINAL REPORT
The BEA agrees overall with the facts and conclusions in the Draft
Report. The comments that are presented here, with the aim of
improving aviation safety, focus on the flight crew’s work during the
flight, on the airline’s conditions for technical operations and the
application of oversight by the Authority, as well as on some aspects of
air traffic control.
Flight Crew
a) The report should underline the absence, during that part of the flight
that it was possible to reconstitute, of the application of Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP), as described in the Operator’s FCOM
documentation, as well as on the critical inadequacies in Crew
Resource Management (CRM). As analyzed in the appendix to this
document, this failure to follow Standard Operating Procedures and
teamwork led to the pilots losing situational awareness and made it
impossible for them to regain control of the airplane in time.
Thus, the crew did not make systematic callouts during the changes in
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