曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
22.10.38 ceilormeter /non-directional radio beacon: 125 m;
22.10.53 ceilormeter /non-directional radio beacon: 115 m;
22.11.08 ceilormeter/non-directional radio beacon: 100 m.
At 22:01:25, during the aircraft descent, the controller advised the crew that the flight altitude
was too high and informed them of the weather conditions in Sochi: “Armavia 967, you’re still
flying too high. Continue descent to 1800 to GUKIN. And
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copy current Sochi weather at 00 UTC”; “Runway 06, wind 130 degrees 2 meters per second,
visibility 4 kilometres, broken 1800, QFE 762 or 1016 hectopascals, light rain shower, mist,
overcast cumulonimbus at height 800 visually, plus 11, dew point plus 11, mountains partly
obscured, exit point 5, runway is wet. And at times, for two hours, visibility 1500, mist at 150.”.
The observed weather passed on to the crew was above the aerodrome minima. The crew
confirmed receipt of the information from the controller and entered all the necessary data into
the FMGS.
At 22:02:19 the controller again pointed out to the crew that the flight altitude was still too high
to enter the takeoff and landing area: “Armavia 967, copied. Passing TABAN. If able expedite
descent or you’ll overshoot the final turn.”, and at 22:03:13 he handed over the aircraft to the
controller of the Sochi holding control point: “Armavia 967, magnetic 220, distance 43, contact
Radar 119.7.”.
At 22:03:05, at an altitude of 12,660 ft (3,860 m) the crew set the aerodrome pressure.
At 22:03:29 the crew contacted the holding controller: “Sochi Radar, Armavia 967, good
evening, descending 1800 to GUKIN, we have information for landing, QFE 1016”. The holding
controller cleared them for descent to 600 m, as per the aerodrome pressure 1016 hPa, by the turn
to final. At that moment the aircraft was at a distance of about 45 km from the end of RW 06. The
crew confirmed the turn to final: “QFE 1016, descending 600 meters, turning final, Armavia
967”.
The aircraft entered the turn to final at 22:03:56. The turn was performed in the HDG mode, with
the maximum roll angle up to 24º. At that time, when the aircraft entered the turn, the flight
altitude was 10,260 ft (3,120 m), and the indicated airspeed was 280 kt (520 km/h). At 22:04:18
the CVR recorded the Captain’s order: “Put on landing lights.” and 15 seconds later a question
from the co-pilot: “Is this snow or rain? What the ****!”, which indicated precipitation at this
stage of the flight. (Fig. 9, Supplement 2)
During the turn on final the crew set the descent rate at -13 m/s and changed the descent mode
from OPEN to VS. The autothrust mode changed as well, from N1 to V/M. The descent rate
increased to -10…-12 m/s. At 22:05:04 the FDR recorded a short period (14 seconds), during
which the autopilot was disengaged. While turning to final the aircraft overshot the runway
heading, and to eliminate the deviation the crew set heading 90. At 22:05:50 the holding
controller informed the crew that they were to the left from the runway heading: “Armavia 967,
you’ve appeared left of the landing course, you can turn onto heading 090 to intercept”. The crew
responded: “ Armavia 967 we have turned already heading 090. Thanks”.
At 22:06:34, after the aircraft turned to heading 90º, the OPEN DESCENT mode was selected
again, with selected altitude 2,048 ft (620 m). At 22:07:02 the crew activated the APPROACH
CONTROL mode. In the pitch channel the autopilot switched to the altitude-hold mode with
preset altitude 620 m. The autothrust mode changed to the V/M MODE (the speed-hold mode).
At that time the crew proceeded to the approach check list.
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Note: Throughout the entire approach the preset speed values were determined by the FMGS,
as the speed was controlled in the MANAGED mode. The autothrust was working in
accordance with the established work logic , maintaining speed VS in configuration 1,
speed VF in configurations 2 and 3, and speed VAPP in configuration FULL.
At 22:07:35 the controller informed the crew of the weather: “Armavia 967, we’ve been given:
cloud base 160 meters, visibility 4000. Proceed at 600 meters without descent”. The crew
confirmed: “Without descent 600 meters, Armavia 967”. The information about the deteriorated
weather conditions caused a negative overreaction by the crew, with the use of expletives. The
crew had been discussing the issue for three minutes, swearing about the controller’s actions
even between the items of the check list. Such behaviour by the crew inevitably must have
resulted in an increase of their psycho-emotional strain.
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