曝光台 注意防骗
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AP/FD and ATHR.
The Captain almost never made the callouts on the selections that he
was making, which prevented the Co-pilot from carrying out his task of
monitoring the parameters and surprised him on two occasions. During
the A320 type rating training that the Captain had undertaken at SAS
Training, several remarks were made on the absence or inadequacy of
his callouts.
The Co-pilot, PNF, did not push the takeover button when he started to
use his sidestick and made no call out for this action. This dual input (in
pitch and roll) may have led Captain, who was unaware of the Co-pilot’s
actions, to believe that the airplane was behaving abnormally.
More generally, apart from during the phases of arrival briefing and
airplane configuration when they were cleared to land, the two pilots
had no common strategy on the conduct of the flight.
b) The CVR transcript throws very clear light on the event. It would
therefore be very useful for it to be appended to the report, in
accordance with Annex 13 - paragraph 5.12.1.
- 2 -
Technical Operations within Armavia
The dysfunctions noted in the crew’s performance are too significant for
them to be merely circumstantial. With regard to this point, it would be
desirable to widen the scope of the report to include the structure of
operations. In the context of the investigation that has been undertaken
on this point, the BEA did not have access to the elements relating to
the airline’s technical operations (ICAO - Annex 6), but the BEA
recommends clarifying the following:
• details on the accident prevention and flight safety programmes;
• details of the flight crew training programme;
• application of the standard operating procedures for each phase
of flight;
• instructions relating to clarification and acceptance of
ATC clearances;
• conditions required to start or continue an instrument approach;
• instructions relating to performing standard approaches and
precision instrument approaches;
• training and instructions relating to the Ground Proximity
Warning System (GPWS) ;
• operator’s operational minima for Sochi aerodrome and crew
training for this specific aerodrome;
• checks on the pilots’ skills in performing emergency procedures;
• information on the operator’s training programme aimed at
developing knowledge and aptitude in human performance and
crew resource management.
Oversight Authority
In relation to the national oversight authority, a certain number of points
could usefully be added to the report, in support of the
recommendations formulated, in particular:
• the requirements and procedures for approving foreign training
centres that carry out training for those possessing Armenian
Pilots’ licenses;
• the programme of inspection of the airline’s operations by the
oversight authority;
• the programme of maintenance follow-up for airplanes not
manufactured in the Commonwealth of Independent States.
In fact, the ICAO Summary Report (April 2004) on the follow-up to the
Safety Oversight Audit of the GDCA of the Republic of Armenia carried
out in 2003 does not provide any answers to these questions.
- 3 -
ATC
The controller treats flight RNV967 as a domestic Russian flight, for
which he could intervene in the Captain’s decision to continue or abort
an approach. This flight was, however, an international flight governed
by different regulations, which specifically allow the Captain to descend
to the minima before deciding on a go-around.
In addition when the controller aborted the final approach, he gave a
series of instructions that appear to be piloting instructions rather than a
clear instruction for a missed approach. In doing this, the controller
transformed himself into a decision-maker for airplane manoeuvring and
it should be noted that, in fact, the pilot performs the instructions
received in a sequential manner. Questions should be asked
concerning this “dual piloting” by the controller and the crew where
those involved do not perceive the airplane’s situation with the same
precision. Thus, it would be desirable for the Russian Civil Aviation
Authority to clarify its doctrine on interventions by ATC in relation to the
responsibilities that normally fall on the Captain.
In conclusion, we propose to remove the phrase “however it did not
render the direct influence on the outcome of the flight.” from the first
sentence in Finding 14. The preceding, clarified by the elements that
are included in the attached analysis, in fact show that aspects linked to
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