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order to stop the descent surprised both of them and, from that moment
on, verbal comments were made almost exclusively by the Co-pilot. The
Captain hardly communicated any more, not announcing the go-around,
for example, and no comments were made on the various alarms and
warnings. No task-sharing was performed; neither of the pilots any
longer had a real overall vision of the situation or any anticipatory
capacities.
This lack of adherence to SOP’s and lack of teamwork contributed to
the pilots’ losing situational awareness and made it impossible for them
to regain control of the airplane. Experience in aviation has clearly
shown how important call-outs are to ensure that both crew members
1 This shows a lack of knowledge of the airplane flight modes as managed by the
FMGS: the unjustified presence of the LAMET point in the flight plan calculated by the
FMGC resulted in prolonging the flight path, thus delaying the start of descent point.
This initiative by the Captain led to an increase in the workload during the descent in
order to correct the glide slope and during interception of the localiser. Without this
point in the flight plan, this work overload would not have occurred.
- 3 -
are fully in the information loop regarding the various Auto Flight
System modes. It is therefore clear that the crew did not possess an
adequate level of performance to undertake the flight in the optimum
safety conditions.
Relations with ATC
Even though this was an international flight, the Sochi controller
managed the flight as if it were a domestic flight, with the tacit
agreement of the Captain, which led him to intervene in the latter’s
decisions.
Note: The air traffic control regulations in Russia depend on the nature of the
flight. If it is a domestic flight, the controller can decide to abort the approach
according to the evolution of the meteorological conditions (ceiling and
visibility). If it is an international flight, the approach, once initiated, can be
continued down to the minima, whatever the evolution of the ceiling and
visibility may be.
In this context, the Captain was clearly looking to influence the
controller by telling him that they had a delegation of Deputies on board
and by asking him to “come on board” during the stopover. For the
crew, the « negotiation » with the controller in fact appeared to have
worked, as indicated by remarks made on several occasions, which
clarifies their subsequent incomprehension of events and their surprise
when the tower controller ordered them to stop the descent.
During the approach, the relationship between the crew and ATC was
characterised by a continuous and progressive increase in irritation and
stress, due to the controller’s regular updates on the height of the cloud
base around the value of the minima, as well as the power struggle with
the controller that may have been engendered in the minds of the crew.
The Captain, in particular, no longer seemed to view the controller as
an ally but rather as an overseer, became more and more annoyed as
they received information and even became positively angry at the time
the crew was cleared to contact the tower for landing.
The slight difference between the meteorological conditions received on
several occasions and the minima surprised the crew, who became
convinced that this was a deliberate technique by the controller, whose
motivation they were trying to understand. Further, the Captain decided
to put the airplane into “Approach” configuration despite the information
available that made it impossible to land. He was persuaded that the
controller was giving them limit values on the cloud base to cover
himself but that he would clear them to land whatever the real
conditions might be. In fact, that is what effectively happened, the
airplane being cleared to land at 8.5 kilometres from the SO beacon,
the go-around point. The crew, now sure that they were going to land,
did not expect any more disturbances. The order to stop the descent,
which arrived forty-six seconds later, was thus completely unexpected
- 4 -
and ran counter to the pilots’ mental representation of the situation. This
destabilised the crew, already annoyed and against the controller, in
particular the Captain, who reacted to this instruction rapidly and, it
appears, without developing any strategy. Further, the nature of the
instructions, oriented on piloting actions instead of consisting of an
explicit order to abort the approach, may have contributed to the pilot’s
disorientation. The pilot carried out the instructions received in
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