曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
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exceeding the speed limitations and stabilize the speed by means of a thrust reduction, while
maintaining the flight path (FCOM 1.22.30). However, at 22:12:51:5 one of the pilots abruptly
moved the thrust control levers to the idle position and then moved them back, which resulted in
disengagement of the autothrust (Attachment 1, Fig. 4). At that time the aircraft descent rate
became -28…-30 m/s, and the flight altitude decreased to 933 ft (284 m). At 22:13:01 the FDR
recorded retraction of the high-lift devices to zero configuration (slats retracted). By then the
pedals were in -7.2…-5.5 position, and the lateral G increased to 0.18…0.25. The combined
control actions of the Captain and the co-pilot resulted in decrease of the roll angle almost to
zero, insignificant increase of the pitch angle to -6º…-7º and decrease of the descent rate to -22
m/s.
Despite the actions undertaken by both pilots at the last seconds of flight to deflect the elevator to
the nose-up position, at 22:13:03 the aircraft impacted the water at an indicated airspeed of 285 kt
(528 km/h), a vertical speed of about -22 m/s, a pitch angle of -4º…-5º nose down and a roll
angle of 9º…10º to the right. At the moment of the impact the flaps were retracted, the slats were
in a position of about 18º retracted, and the landing gear was extended.
The experiments on the simulator showed that the aircraft could have been recovered at any stage
of the flight until 22:12:58, provided the crew acted properly. The simulator experiment allowed
data to be obtained regarding the decrease in altitude during recovery of the aircraft in a
configuration 18/0 at V =260-270kt, with pitch angles -4,5…-6,5° and various roll angles from 0
to 39º, and with the side stick in various back positions, including the fully back position. For the
parameters similar to those in the accident flight (V=270kt, pitch angle -5,3°, roll angle about
zero), the minimum altitude, at which the aircraft could be recovered and controlled to climb, was
200-230 ft. Allowing 2 seconds for the crew response to the EGPWS warning, the crew had 9
seconds spare to recover the aircraft.
Findings
1. The A-320 EK-32009 aircraft was owned by the FUNNEL company (Cayman
Islands) and was operated by Armavia. The aircraft had valid registration and airworthiness
certificates issued by the Aviation Administration of the Republic of Armenia.
2. Aircraft maintenance was carried out by Sabena Technics (Belgium) specialists
in accordance with the agreement with Armavia. Additional work was carried out by Armavia
maintenance personnel. No deficiencies in the maintenance service were revealed that could have
influenced the outcome of the last flight.
3. The aircraft, its systems and engines were serviceable on departure from
Yerevan. The Investigation Commission did not bring to light any evidence of any aircraft system
or engine failure during the last flight.
4. The aircraft’s movements were completely determined by changes in the control
surfaces and the engine modes. The autopilot was working according to the established work
logic. Aerodynamic and thrust performance of the aircraft corresponded to the characteristics of
the aircraft type. There were no external influences on the aircraft (wind shear, etc.).
5. The aircraft had a sufficient amount of the correct fuel for safe completion of
the flight. The take-off, landing weight and balance of the aircraft did not exceed the limitations
specified in the A320 FCOM.
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6. There was no disintegration of the aircraft in the air. All aircraft structural
damage resulted from the impact with the water.
7. The crew had valid pilot’s licenses and medical certificates. Their qualifications
and state of health corresponded to the character of the mission performed and allowed safe
execution of the flight. According to the documents presented, the professional skill level of the
flight crew members was in accordance with Armenian CAA regulations.
8. Armavia does not exercise operational supervision of the A320 aircraft crews’
flights by using flight recorder information, which made it impossible to fully evaluate the
professional skill level of the flight crew members.
9. According to the data presented, the pre-flight rest of the crew prior to the
departure to the Sochi airport consisted of over 24 hours at home. However, the crew’s cockpit
conversations indicated their fatigue, which could have influenced the outcome of the flight. The
flight was performed at night, when the probability of mistakes is especially high.
10. The meteorological and air navigation support for the flight met the
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