This highlights the need for developing countermeasures to restore the level of vigilance and alertness for the descent, approach and landing;
.
Pressure of flight schedule (e.g., making up for takeoff delay);
Human Factors in Approach and Landing Accidents
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. Any crew-induced or controller-induced circumstance resulting in insufficient time to plan, prepare and execute a safe approach;
This includes accepting requests from ATC for:
. flying higher and/or faster than desired; and/or,
. flying shorter routings than desired;
.
Insufficient ATC awareness of crew or aircraft capability to accommodate a last-minute-change;
.
Late takeover from automation (e.g., in case of AP failing to capture the GS, usually due to crew failing to arm the approach mode);
.
Lack of awareness of tail wind component;
.
Incorrect anticipation of aircraft deceleration characteristics in level-flight or on a 3-degree glideslope;
.
Failure to recognize excessive parameter-deviations or to remember the excessive-parameter-deviation criteria;
.
Belief that the aircraft will be stabilized at the stabilization height or shortly thereafter;
.
PNF excessive confidence in the PF in achieving a timely stabilization;
.
PF/PNF excessive reliance on each other in calling excessive deviations or in calling go-around; and/or,
.
Visual illusions during the acquisition of visual references or during the visual segment.
Runway excursions and overruns:
The following factors are recurrent in runway excursions and overruns (i.e., highlighting human factors involving controllers, flightcrew and maintenance personnel alike):
.
No go-around decision, when warranted;
.
Inaccurate weather information on:
. surface wind;
. runway condition; and/or,
. wind shear;
.
Incorrect assessment of crosswind limit for prevailing runway conditions;
.
Incorrect assessment of landing distance:
. for prevailing wind and runway conditions; or,
. following a malfunction affecting the configuration or braking capability;
.
Captain (when PNF) taking over control and landing following the call or initiation of a go-around by the First Officer (as PF);
.
Late takeover from automation, when required (e.g., late take over from autobrake in case of system malfunction);
.
Inoperative equipment not accounted for per MEL (e.g., one or more brake being inoperative); and/or,
.
Undetected thrust asymmetry (i.e., forward / reverse asymmetric thrust condition).
Adverse wind / crosswind landing:
The following human factors often are cited in discussing events involving adverse wind / crosswind conditions:
.
Reluctance to recognize changes in landing data over time (e.g., wind direction shift, wind velocity change or wind gustiness increase);
.
Seeking any evidence to confirm the initial information and initial options (i.e., reluctance to change pre-established plans);
.
Reluctance to divert to an airport with less crosswind conditions; and/or,
.
Lack of time to observe, evaluate and control the aircraft attitude and flight path in a highly dynamic situation.
Summary of key points
Addressing Human Factors issues in approach-and-landing incidents and accidents is an effort that must include:
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