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interest to the aviation industry if it impacted on safety issues such as in Canada.
Increasingly the term is now applied to organisation theory. A culture creates a
homogenous set of assumptions and decision-making premises within the
organisation such that, at work, “we are all, to some extent, culturally-bound in terms
of our behaviours and attitudes” (Hayward, 1997). An organisation “is in a large part
constituted by its speech exchanges” and “if that communication is misunderstood,
the existence of the organisation itself becomes more tenuous” Weick (1990). Speech
exchange and social interaction is an important means by which an organisation is
built. The interest in organisational culture has led to the systematic investigation of
organisational accidents. In aviation the emphasis is on developing a safety culture,
the four critical subcomponents of which are a reporting culture, a just culture, a
flexible culture and an informed culture (Reason, 1997).
Hayward’s paper reviews the considerable amount of work which has examined the
role of national culture in relation to flight crew behaviour. The unequivocal findings
are that national culture is a powerful influence on work performance in the cockpit.
The program of Cockpit Resource Management (CRM—now often called crew
resource management), which sought to overcome problems of leadership, teamwork
and personality interactions, has had to be tailored to fit with the national,
organisational or vocational culture of the target population. National culture also
affects how we attribute blame—what Reason (1997:127) calls the blame cycle.
People of Western cultures place great value on their personal freedom. Because
people are regarded as free agents, errors are seen as being, at least in part, voluntary
actions. Thus we readily accept human error as a cause of accidents when it is really
a consequence of other factors.
The national culture of a crew may impact on air traffic control communications in
ways other than expected. The crew of Avianca 052 demonstrated a subordinate-tosuperior
relationship with controllers, unnecessarily accepting holding patterns and
instructions despite their fuel emergency, and being indirect in their communications.
There have been anecdotal reports of accidents occurring because pilots refused to
abort landings for fear of loss of face. An American pilot may laugh at his attempts to
report at “Boollooloo estimating Paraburdoo”, but Korean or Japanese pilots may be
too embarrassed to ask for track shortening if the new reporting points have words
with “R’s” in them which they find difficult to pronounce—the issue is loss of face,
not accent.
Little work appears to have been published on culture in air traffic control. Owen
(1995) studied the learning and organisational culture of ATC in Australia and noted
evidence of a group culture including specialised language and symbols: “ATC has a
32
highly stylised communication form. Inclusion in the group depends on being able to
use this language competently, indeed effortlessly”. That a workplace culture may
work against safety was noted in the “Seaview Inquiry” (Staunton, 1996:272) which
“found evidence of a local culture...this is Sydney, this is the way we do it...”. It was
related to a laissez-faire approach to procedures by flight service officers and air
traffic controllers which was reflected in all the tape transcripts. In particular, few
positions identified themselves, many non-procedural phrases were used and there
was a “certain casualness in procedures which can certainly contribute to incidents
and accidents”. According to Reason (1997:121), violations of rules and procedures
(as distinct from errors) have their origins in cultural factors, so it seems likely that
these non-standard phraseologies were a manifestation of a poor safety culture.
Also noted by the Inquiry (p232) was a strong culture which sought to keep
controllers and flight service officers “out of the cockpit” on the basis that the pilot is
in the best position to fly the aircraft and make the complex decisions necessary to
ensure its safety. But the Inquiry also found a pilot culture of reluctance to report
difficulties, raising the question, if a pilot hasn’t declared an emergency, at what point
does a controller’s unease trigger alarmbells? This was an area of some exploration
by the Inquiry seeking to determine why flight service officers had not queried the
pilot about his unplanned and, as we now know, significant level changes. Perhaps
air traffic service officers have become overconfident and feel that they do not have to
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