曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
4.3.5.5.1.1 ACAS shall not modify an RA sense in a way that makes it incompatible with an RAC received from an
equipped threat jf own aircraft address is higher in value than that of the Lhreat.
4.3.5.6 RA strengtlz retention Subject to the requirement that a descend RA is not generated at low altitude
(4.3.5.4.1), an RA shall not be modified if the time to closest approach is too short to achieve a signilicarlt response or if
the threat is diverging in range.
4.3.5.7 Weakening an RA. An KA shall not be weakened if it is likely that i t would subsequently need to be
strengthened.
1.3.5.8 ACAS-equipped threats. The RA shall be compatible with all the RACs transmitted to threats (4.3.6.1,3). If
an RAC is received from a threat before own ACAS generates an RAC for that threat, the RA generated shall be
compatible with the RAC received unless such an hi is more likely to reduce separation than increase it and own aircraft
address is lower in value than that of the threat.
Note.- In encounters with more than one threat where it is necessary to pass above some threats and below other
threats, this starzdard can be interpreted as referring to the whole duration qf the RA. Specifically, it is permissible to
retain an RA fo climb (descend) towards a threat that is above (below) own aircraft provided there is a calc~llated
intention to provide adequate separation from all threats by subsequently levelling-03
4.3.5.9 Encoding of AM subfield. On each cycle of an RA, the RA sense, strength and attsibutes shall be encoded
in the active RA (ARA) subfield (4.3.3.4.2.2.1.1). If the ARA subfield has not been refreshed for an interval of 6 s, it
shall be set to 0, along with the MTE subfield in the same message (4.3.3.4.2.2.1.3).
4.3.5.10 System response time. The system delay from receipt of the relevant SSR reply to presentation of an RA
sense and strength to the pilot shall be as short as possible and shall not exceed 1.5 s.
4.3.6 Coordination and communication
4.3.6.1 PROVISIONS FOR COORDINATION WITH ACAS-EQUIPPED THREATS
4.3.6.1.1 Multi-aircraft coordination. In a multi-aircraft situation, ACAS shall coordinate with each equipped threat
individually.
4.3.6.1.2 Data protection during coordination. ACAS shall prevent simultaneous access to stored data by
concurrent processes, in particular, during resolution message processing.
4.3.6.1.3 Coordination interrogation. Each cycle ACAS shall transmit a coordination interrogation to each
equipped threat, unless generation of an RA is delayed because it is no1 possible to select an RA that can be predictcd
to provide adequate separation (4.3.5.1). The resolution message transmitted to a threat shall include an RAC selected
for that threat. If an RAC has been received from the threat before ACAS selects an RAC for that threat, the selected
RAC shall be compatible with the received RAC unless no more than three cycles have elapsed since the RAC was
received, the RAC is altitude-crossing, and own aircraft address is lower in value than that of the threat in which case
ACAS shall select its RA independently. If an RAC received from an equipped threat is inco~npatiblew ith the RAC
own ACAS has selected for that threat, ACAS shall rnodify Lhc selected RAC to be compatible with the received RAC
if own aircraft address is higher in value than that of the threat.
Note.-- The RAC included in the resolutioiz messuge is in the form of a vertical RAC (VRCJ for ACAS II
(4.3.8.4.2.3.2.2) and a vertical RAC (VRC) and/or lzorizontal RAC (HRC) for ACAS 111.
4.3.6.1.3.1 Coordination ternzinution. Within the cycle during which an intruder ceases to be a reason for
maintaining ~ h Rc A , ACAS shall send a resolution message to that intrudcr by means of a coordination interrogation.
The resolution message shall include the cancellation code for the last RAC sent lo that intruder while it was a reason
for maintaining ihc RA.
Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecornmunication+s Volume IV
Nots- During an encounter with a single threat, tlze threat ceases to be a reason for the RA when the conditions
for cancelling the RA are met. Dur~lzg an encoilnter with multiple threats, a threat ceases to be a reason for the RA
when the coliditions for cancelling the RA are met in respect of that threat, even though the RA may have to be
maintained because of other threats.
4.3.6.1.3.2 ACAS coordination interrogations shall be transmitted until a coordination reply is received from the
threat, up to a maximum of not less than six and not more than twelve attempts. The successive interrogations shall be
nominally equally spaced over a period of 100 *5 ms. If the maximum number of attempts is made and no reply is
received, ACAS shall continue its regular processing sequence.
4.3.6.1.3.3 ACAS shall provide parity protection (4.3.3.4.2.3.2.6 and 4.3.3.4.2.3.2.7) for all fields in the coordination
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
附件10--航空电信an10_v4_3ed(73)
