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STEP 2: IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
The hazard identification step should consider all possible sources of system failure. Depending on the
nature and size of the system under consideration, these could include the following:
Chapter 13. Safety Assessments 13-5
a) equipment (hardware and software);
b) operating environment (e.g. physical conditions, airspace and air route design);
c) human operators;
d) human/machine interface;
e) operational procedures;
f) maintenance procedures; and
g) external services.
All possible configurations of the system should be considered. It is important to also analyse the impact that
any construction will have on daily operations. A list of the types of issues to be taken into consideration in
the development phase of an aerodrome, where construction may have an impact on daily operations, is
provided in Table 13-2.
Table 13-2. Typical impact of aerodrome construction on operations
Examples of impact issues
How will the various airport surfaces, and those of the navigation and
electronic equipment, be protected from the construction work, vehicles and
storage areas?
What temporary operating, ATC and engineering procedures need to be
established?
What will be the daily/nightly start, control and completion of the work
procedures? These should include:
— reference to an inspection of the works prior to return to operation, if
applicable, and who is to be responsible on behalf of the aerodrome for
ensuring that this is carried out;
— the chosen method of communication between ATC tower and the site;
and
— how long after the last departure and before the first arrival will the work
commence and cease respectively.
What procedures will be adopted should the weather deteriorate, and what
actions need to be considered prior to the onset of low visibility procedures?
What action will be taken should an emergency occur?
13-6 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
All persons involved in the hazard identification process should be aware of the significance of latent
conditions (described in Chapter 4), as these are not usually obvious. The process should specifically
address questions such as, “how might staff misinterpret this new procedure?” or “how might a person
misuse this new function/system (intentionally or unintentionally)?”
The hazard identification step should be initiated at the earliest possible stage in the project. For large-scale
projects, there may be several hazard identification sessions at different stages of the project development.
The level of detail required depends on the complexity of the system under consideration and the stage of
the system life cycle at which the assessment is being done. In general, it could be expected that less detail
would be required for an assessment carried out during the operational requirement definition stage than for
one during the detailed design stage.
Hazard identification sessions
A structured approach to the identification of hazards ensures that, as much as possible, all potential
hazards are identified. Suitable techniques for ensuring such a structured approach might include:
a) Checklists. Review experience and available data from accidents, incidents or similar systems and
draw up a hazard checklist. Potentially hazardous areas will require further evaluation.
b) Group review. Group sessions may be used to review the hazard checklist, to brainstorm hazards
more broadly, or to conduct a detailed scenario analysis.
Hazard identification sessions require a range of experienced operational and technical personnel, and are
usually done through a form of managed group discussion. A facilitator who is familiar with the techniques
should manage the group sessions. A safety manager, if appointed, would normally fill this role. Appendix 1
to this chapter includes further guidance on the conduct of group sessions for hazard analysis.
The role of the facilitator is not an easy one. The facilitator must guide the discussions towards a consensus,
but at the same time ensure that all participants have the opportunity to express their views, and allow
sufficiently wide-ranging discussions to ensure that all possible hazards are identified.
The other group participants should be chosen for their expertise in fields relevant to the project being
assessed. The range of expertise needs to be sufficiently broad to ensure that all aspects of the system are
addressed; however, it is also important to keep the group to a manageable size. The number of participants
needed for the hazard identification sessions depends on the size and complexity of the system under
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