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The credibility of the investigative process will largely hinge on the technical competence and objectivity of
the investigators.
Safety oversight4
17.2.21 Maintenance of high standards in ATS implies a programme of monitoring and surveillance of
the activities of all controllers and supporting staff, as well as of the reliability and performance of their
equipment.
17.2.22 The objective of the safety oversight of ATS providers is to verify compliance with relevant:
a) ICAO SARPs and procedures;
b) national legislation and regulations; and
c) national and international best practices.
17.2.23 The methods of safety oversight may include safety inspections and/or safety audits of the
organizations concerned. Safety oversight should also involve a systematic review of significant safety
occurrences. As outlined in Chapter 5, one of the core elements of an SMS is safety audits. The safety
oversight procedures need to be standardized and documented to ensure consistency in their application.
17.2.24 The staff responsible for this oversight function require a good knowledge of, and preferably,
practical experience in, safety management procedures. Doc 4444 requires that qualified personnel having a
full understanding of relevant procedures, practices and factors affecting human performance, conduct
safety reviews of ATS units on a regular and systematic basis.
17.2.25 Doc 4444 also requires that data used in safety monitoring programmes be collected from as
wide a range of sources as possible, as the safety-related consequences of particular procedures or
systems may not be realized until after an incident has occurred. Thus, the audit programme should include
the safety interfaces with all users of the ATS system, operators, airport management and any contracted
service providers.
Managing change
17.2.26 The provision of ATS is a dynamic activity. Doc 4444 requires that a safety assessment be
carried out in respect of any proposals for significant airspace reorganizations, for significant changes in the
4. See Chapters 10 and 14 for further guidance on safety oversight in ATS.
Chapter 17. Air Traffic Services (ATS) 17-7
provision of ATS procedures applicable to a defined airspace or an aerodrome, and for the introduction of
new equipment, systems or facilities. Examples of significant changes include:
a) reduced separation minima;
b) new operating procedures, including arrival and departure procedures (STARs and SIDs);
c) reorganization of the ATS route structure;
d) re-sectorization of an airspace; and
e) implementation of new communications, surveillance or other safety-significant systems and
equipment, including those providing new functionality and/or capabilities.
17.2.27 In brief, a safety assessment involves a multidisciplinary group of experts who systematically
identify hazards and recommend measures to reduce or eliminate the inherent risks to an acceptable level.
Further information on conducting safety assessments is contained in Chapter 13.
17.2.28 Factors to consider in conducting a safety assessment include:
a) types of aircraft and their performance characteristics, including their navigation capabilities and
performance;
b) traffic density and distribution;
c) airspace complexity, ATS route structure and the classification of the airspace;
d) aerodrome layout, including runway and taxiway configurations and preferences;
e) air-ground communications capabilities and usage;
f) surveillance and alerting systems; and
g) significant local topography or weather phenomena.
17.3 CHANGING ATS PROCEDURES
17.3.1 Air traffic systems are particularly vulnerable during periods of changing procedures, whether
modifying existing procedures or introducing new ones. Risk management techniques are used in working
through the effects of proposed changes. The principles of risk management are outlined in Chapter 6.
Chapter 13 outlines seven useful steps in assessing new equipment or procedures.
17.3.2 The objective of assessing ATS procedures is to provide assurance that, as far as reasonably
practicable, potential hazards associated with the control of aircraft have been identified and actions to
mitigate the significant risks associated with the hazards have been put in place. Typically, this risk
management process involves the following:
a) hazard identification (HAZid);
b) hazard analysis, including likelihood of occurrence;
17-8 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
c) consequence identification and analysis; and
d) assessment against risk criteria.
17.3.3 When management proposes to develop, validate, change or introduce operational procedures,
where practicable they should:
a) utilize hazard identification, risk assessment and risk management techniques prior to the
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