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domestic or unscheduled operations);
c) organizational status (e.g. department of an airline versus an independent enterprise);
d) maturity of the organization and its workforce (e.g. corporate stability and experience);
e) labour-management relationships (e.g. recent history and complexity);
f) current corporate culture (versus desired safety culture); and
g) scope of maintenance work (e.g. line servicing versus heavy overhaul of aircraft or major systems).
Organizing for safety
19.2.4 Chapter 12 (see Figures 12-1 and 12-2) provides two sample organizational structures for an
airline, both of which reflect direct and informal reporting lines between operations, safety and maintenance.
Such communication channels depend on the trust and respect established in the day-to-day working
relationships of those involved.
19.2.5 For an aircraft operator, the safety manager (SM) must have clearly defined responsibilities and
reporting lines with respect to safety management in maintenance. The maintenance organization may
require a technical specialist to work with the SM. As a minimum, the SM will require specialist advice from
the maintenance department.
19.2.6 The company’s safety committee should include representation from the maintenance
department. In large operators, a dedicated sub-committee for maintenance safety issues may be
warranted.
Documentation and records management
19.2.7 Maintenance departments depend heavily on systems for systematically acquiring, storing and
retrieving the voluminous information required for safety management. Some examples follow:
Chapter 19. Aircraft Maintenance 19-3
a) Technical libraries must be kept current (for such things as engineering orders, type certifications,
airworthiness directives and service bulletins).
b) Maintenance defects and work completed must be recorded in detail.
c) Performance and system monitoring data must be retained for trend analysis.
d) Corporate safety policies, objectives and goals must be formally documented and distributed.
e) Records must be kept on personnel training, qualification and currency, etc.
f) Information on component history, life, etc. must be kept.
19.2.8 In a large operator, much of this information will be computerized. Therefore, the success of an
SMS in a maintenance organization will largely depend on the quality and timeliness of its document and
records management systems.
Resource allocations
19.2.9 The best SMS on paper will be useless without adequate resources. To protect against losses
due to an accident, expenditures will be required. For example, resources need to be allocated for:
a) personnel with expertise to design and implement the maintenance safety system;
b) training in safety management for all staff; and
c) information management systems to store safety data, and expertise to analyse the data.
Safety culture
19.2.10 A poor safety culture in a maintenance organization can lead to unsafe work practices not
being corrected — possibly creating latent unsafe conditions that may not cause a problem for years.
Management’s success in fostering a positive safety culture in the maintenance department will derive in
large measure from how the foregoing issues are addressed and from how the SMS is implemented.
Principal tools for safety management in maintenance
19.2.11 Effective operation of an SMS for maintenance builds upon risk-based decision-making, a
concept that has long been integral to maintenance practices. For example, maintenance cycles are built
upon probabilities that systems and components would not fail for the period of the cycle. Components are
often replaced because they are “time expired”, even though they may remain functionally serviceable.
Based on knowledge and experience, risks of unexpected failure are reduced to acceptable levels.
19.2.12 Some of the principal tools for operating an SMS for the maintenance function include:
a) clearly defined and enforced SOPs;
b) risk-based resource allocations;
19-4 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
c) hazard and incident reporting systems;
d) flight data analysis programmes;
e) trend monitoring and safety analyses (including cost-benefit analyses);
f) competent investigation of maintenance-related occurrences;
g) training in safety management; and
h) communication and feedback systems (including information exchange and safety promotion).
Safety oversight and programme evaluation
19.2.13 As with any “system”, feedback is required to ensure that the individual elements of the
maintenance SMS are functioning as intended. Continuing high standards of safety in a maintenance
organization imply regular monitoring and surveillance of all maintenance activities. This is especially so at
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Safety Management Manual (SMM) 安全管理手册(148)
