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a) ATS-related hazards. A hazard is defined as a source of potential harm or a situation with a
potential to cause loss. Basic ATS-related hazards include:
1) mid-air collisions;
2) collisions on the ground;
3) wake vortex encounters;
4) turbulence events; and
5) collisions with the ground.
b) Hazardous scenarios. Hazardous scenarios describe the specific hazard under consideration. For
example, when considering the mid-air collision hazard at an airport, hazardous scenarios might be:
1) a mid-air collision between a departing and an arriving aircraft; and
2) a mid-air collision between aircraft on parallel approach.
c) Initiating events. The initiating events describe the generic reasons for the hazardous scenario
occurring. This may be a deviation from a flight path. For example, various initiating events for the
hazardous scenarios of a mid-air collision between a departing and an arriving aircraft include an
aircraft busting a level restriction, or an aircraft deviating from a SID or STAR.
d) Hazard causes. The hazard causes describe how the initiating event started. Initiating events may
be caused by external influences, human error, equipment failure or procedure design mistakes that
17-APP 2-2 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
can start a chain of events which could lead to a hazard. For an aircraft deviating from a SID, the
cause could be an equipment failure such as a control system failure, or human error such as a pilot
selecting the wrong SID in the flight management system (FMS).
e) Recovery factors. The recovery factors describe the systems available to prevent or reduce the
likelihood of initiating events becoming hazardous scenarios. For a mid-air collision, the recovery
factors include the provision of ATC, the use of TCAS, pilot “see and avoid”, and the flight path
geometry.
f) Recovery factor failures. Recovery factors might fail to prevent a mid-air collision. Recovery factor
failures for TCAS could include a transponder not being fitted to one of the aircraft, or the pilot not
reacting to the alerts.
2.2 The HAZid method uses keywords or prompt words to systematically generate possible deviations
from the norm for ATS and flying tasks. The procedure then examines the effect of each deviation on ATSrelated
safety.
External influences
2.3 HAZid begins by considering the external influences on a single aircraft on a fixed flight path. The
sources of these external influences could be, for example:
a) meteorological;
b) topographical;
c) environmental; and
e) man-made.
Possible deviations from planned flight path
2.4 Once external influences to safe flight are identified and recorded, the HAZid technique considers
possible deviations from the planned flight path and how these may be caused by internal operational
events. These deviations may become initiating events for hazardous scenarios. Typical sources of internal
operational events include:
a) ATC separation;
b) navigation aids;
c) airport design — runway;
d) airspace design;
e) aircraft design and maintenance; and
f) aircraft operation.
2.5 Keywords or prompt words are used to systematically identify possible deviations from planned
flight paths. Possible deviations are examined through a “bottom-up” consideration of:
Chapter 17. Air Traffic Services (ATS)
Appendix 2 17-APP 2-3
a) Procedures in use. The procedures in use relate to the design of airspace and airports, ATC
procedures and flight procedures. These procedures can lead to hazardous scenarios without
additional system failures, i.e. hazardous scenarios can exist without requiring deviations from
normal flight paths. For example, the vertical separation buffer for the base of CTA can be 150 m
(500 ft). However, wake turbulence separation is applied when an aircraft is operating up to 300 m
(1 000 ft) below.
b) Human tasks. Human tasks may fail through various types of human error. This is a specialist area
of analysis, and advice should be sought from appropriate Human Factors specialists.
c) Equipment functionality. A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is normally used to analyse
the influences of equipment failures on the ATS system. The method is applied at the functional
level to all ATS equipment, aircraft communication equipment, and navigation, surveillance, flight
control and power plant equipment.
d) Geometric factors. There may be other factors that are not related to human error or equipment
failure but are still necessary for the hazard to occur. This is usually a description of the geometry of
encounter.
3. HAZARD ANALYSIS
3.1 Having identified particular hazards, several techniques are available for assessing them, both
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