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specifies accountabilities for particular activities with no overlap or omission. The contents of the statement
will vary depending on organizational size, complexity and relationships.
Chapter 2. Responsibility for Managing Safety 2-7
2.4 GLOBAL COOPERATION
2.4.1 Although the organizational elements described above have specific roles and responsibilities for
safety management, the international nature of aviation demands that their individual efforts be integrated
into a coherent, global aviation safety system, requiring cooperation and collaboration at all levels.
2.4.2 Global collaboration occurs in international fora such as:
a) corporate associations (e.g. IATA, ACI, ATA and CANSO);
b) national and international aviation associations (e.g. NBAA, EBAA and IBAC);
c) international federations of national associations (e.g. IFALPA and IFATCA);
d) international safety bodies (e.g. FSF and ISASI);
e) industry/government groups (e.g. CAST and GAIN); and
f) major manufacturers’ safety forums.
2.4.3 Such organizations are able to provide “subject matter experts” for meetings and studies. For
example, manufacturers may invite input through “user” groups, and the users themselves may consult the
manufacturers to better understand particular operating practices. As a result, there is a healthy crosspollination
of safety-related information and knowledge. Such collaborative efforts not only are safetyoriented
but also make good business sense for the following reasons:
a) The air transport industry is strongly interdependent. The consequences of a major air disaster can
affect many of the stakeholders. Mutual concern over damage to the industry’s reputation, goodwill
and public confidence tends to promote collective action over the parochial pursuit of special
interests.
b) There is strength in collective action.
c) Globalization of markets has transcended State borders and authority.
2.4.4 Examples of the ways in which global collaboration improves the efficiency and effectiveness of
safety management efforts include:
a) harmonization, coherence and interoperability through universal design standards, SOPs and
terminology;
b) global sharing of safety-related information;
c) early identification and resolution of global systemic hazards; and
d) back-up and mutual reinforcement through overlapping effort and sharing of specialist resources.
____________________
3-1
Chapter 3
STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME
3.1 GENERAL
3.1.1 As discussed in Chapter 2, States bear significant responsibility for establishing an environment
conducive to safe and efficient aviation activities. The State, as the signatory to the Chicago Convention, is
responsible for implementation of ICAO SARPs affecting flight operations, airspace and navigation services,
and aerodromes for which it has responsibility. Generally, these responsibilities include both regulatory
functions (licensing, certification, etc.) and safety oversight functions to ensure compliance with regulatory
requirements.
3.1.2 Each State must make provisions for the safety of the aviation system within its jurisdiction.
However, each State is but one component of the larger global aviation system. In that sense, States also
have a responsibility for meeting the requirements of the larger international system.
3.1.3 The systems approach to the State’s aviation safety programme advocated in this manual
encompasses all organizational levels, disciplines and system life-cycle phases. Factors related to
meteorology, aeronautical charts, aircraft operations, airworthiness, aeronautical information, the transport
of dangerous goods, etc. could all have an impact on the safety of the total system. To fulfil its diverse safety
responsibilities effectively, a State requires a “safety programme” to integrate its multidisciplinary safety
activities into a coherent whole.
3.1.4 A State’s safety management responsibilities may extend beyond regulatory and oversight
functions. In many States, the State is both the safety regulator and a service provider. Notwithstanding the
trend in many States towards privatization and corporatization, many States still deliver services for air traffic
management and airports. Where a State is both the regulatory authority and a provider of operational
services, a clear distinction must be made between the two functions.
3.1.5 ICAO requires that operators and service providers implement a safety management system
(SMS) to achieve acceptable levels of safety within their operations. Generally, a State does not require an
SMS for its regulatory and oversight functions. However, those States conducting flight operations, operating
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