曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
notably, by TRM training.
6. INTEGRATING TEM IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT
6.1 The distinction between the different categories of threats may be trivial to operational controllers
— threats exist and need to be managed during everyday shifts. On the other hand, training managers may
wish to note which categories of threats are being addressed in the curriculum for their unit (although they
are most likely not presented as threats in the training). Some of the threats are often addressed in a less
formal way, e.g. as anecdotal information during on-the-job training.
6.2 An airport with a basic layout where backtracking on the runway is required for movements is an
example. Controllers working on that airport will have received training (in the classroom, in the simulator or
on the job) to enable them to control the traffic at that airport, and they will be used to managing the threat.
Nevertheless, every backtracking aircraft poses a threat to the ATC operation and needs to be managed by
the controllers.
6.3 From the perspective of an ATC safety manager, it is relevant to know how this particular threat is
managed by the controllers on a day-to-day basis. Are they able to manage it without any significant
problems, or are the difficulties to managing it so common that they go unreported? In case of the former,
there might be no requirement for the safety manager to take specific action. In case of the latter, there
obviously is a need for safety management action.
____________________
18-1
Chapter 18
AERODROME OPERATIONS
18.1 AERODROME SAFETY — GENERAL
18.1.1 Safety, regularity and efficiency of aircraft operations at aerodromes are of paramount
importance. To this end, Annex 14, Volume I, requires States to certify aerodromes used for international
operations and recommends certification of aerodromes available for public use. The aerodrome certification
process includes approval/acceptance of an aerodrome manual that outlines the aerodrome’s safety
management system (SMS). Although the potential for a catastrophic accident during aircraft operations on
the ground exists, the likelihood of a minor accident while the aircraft is on the ground, particularly during a
turnaround, is high. Each year, aircraft operators incur significant financial losses associated with accidents
during ground operations.
18.1.2 Accidents and incidents occurring in flight are generally well reported and investigated.
However, ground accidents do not always receive the same level of attention. Minor accidents and incidents
may not be reported to the aerodrome management by the operators, tenants and service providers based
at the aerodrome. These minor accidents and incidents may be a breeding ground for more serious
accidents (see Chapter 4, 4.4.16 to 4.4.18 on the 1:600 Rule). Understanding the conditions that create
hazards to safety at aerodromes is vital to effective safety management.
18.1.3 Safety at aerodromes requires much the same approach to safety management as that
required for safe flight operations. The concentration of many different activities at aerodromes creates
unique circumstances with significant accident potential.
18.1.4 Ground occurrences must be seen within the overall context of aerodrome operations.
Aerodromes bring together a volatile mixture of activities with high-risk potential. Some of the factors
contributing to this risk potential include:
a) traffic volume and mixture (including domestic and international, scheduled and non-scheduled,
charter and specialty operations, commercial and recreational aviation, fixed and rotary wing, etc.);
b) vulnerability of aircraft on the ground (awkward, fragile, etc.);
c) abundance of high-energy sources (including jet blast, propellers, fuels, etc.);
d) extremes of weather (temperatures, winds, precipitation and poor visibility);
e) wildlife (birds and animals) hazards;
f) aerodrome layout (especially taxiway routings, congested apron areas, and building and structure
design limiting line of sight, possibly leading to a runway incursion);
g) inadequacy of visual aids (e.g. signs, markings and lighting);
h) non-adherence to established procedures (especially at uncontrolled aerodromes);
18-2 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
i) vehicles on the apron;
j) problems in information transfer (communications) with those operating on the airside;
k) runway usage (including simultaneous multiple runway usage, intersection departures and
preferential runways);
l) ground and apron control (sometimes compromised by frequency congestion, use of non-standard
phraseology, language difficulties, mistaken call signs, etc.);
m) inadequacy and unreliability of visual and non-visual aids for landing;
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
Safety Management Manual (SMM) 安全管理手册(139)
