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Appendix 1 to this chapter provides examples of symptoms that may be indicative of poor safety health. A
weakness in any one area may be tolerable; however, weaknesses in many areas indicate serious systemic
risks, compromising the safety health of the organization.
Figure 10-1. Variation in safety health
Time
Healthy zone
Unhealthy zone
Regulatory compliance
(Minimum acceptable level)
Operating certificate granted
Operational and management
experience builds
Merger and labour dispute
New management
Safety management
system adopted
Safety incident
reporting system
implemented
Flight data analysis
programme
Safety health
(Resistance to misadventure)
Chapter 10. Safety Performance Monitoring 10-3
Indicators of improving safety health
10.2.5 Appendix 1 also provides indicators of improving safety health. These reflect the industry’s best
practices and a good safety culture. Organizations with the best safety records tend to “maintain or improve
their safety fitness” by implementing measures to increase their resistance to the unforeseen. They
consistently do more than just meet the minimum regulatory requirements.
10.2.6 Identifying the symptoms may provide a valid impression of an organization’s safety health;
however, information may still be lacking for effective decision-making. Additional tools are required to
measure safety performance in a systematic and convincing way.
Statistical safety performance indicators
10.2.7 Statistical safety performance indicators illustrate historic safety achievements; they provide a
“snapshot” of past events. Presented either numerically or graphically, they provide a simple, easily
understood indication of the level of safety in a given aviation sector in terms of the number or rate of
accidents, incidents or casualties over a given time frame. At the highest level, this could be the number of
fatal accidents per year over the past ten years. At a lower (more specific) level, the safety performance
indicators might include such factors as the rate of specific technical events (e.g. losses of separation,
engine shutdowns, TCAS advisories and runway incursions).
10.2.8 Statistical safety performance indicators can be focused on specific areas of the operation to
monitor safety achievement, or on identifying areas of interest. This “retrospective” approach is useful in
trend analysis, hazard identification, risk assessment, as well as in the choice of risk control measures.
10.2.9 Since accidents (and serious incidents) are relatively random and rare events in aviation,
assessing safety health based solely on statistical safety performance indicators may not provide a valid
predictor of safety performance, especially in the absence of reliable exposure data. Reviewing the past
does little to assist organizations in their quest to be proactive and to put in place those systems most likely
to protect against the unknown.
Acceptable levels of safety
10.2.10 Aviation organizations must meet regulatory requirements to ensure acceptable levels of
safety. The organizations that just meet these minimal requirements, however, may not be healthy from a
safety point of view. Although they have reduced their vulnerabilities to the unsafe acts and conditions most
conducive to accidents, they have only taken minimum precautionary measures.
10.2.11 Weak organizations that fail to meet the acceptable levels of safety will be removed from the
aviation system either proactively, by the regulator revoking their operating certificate, or reactively, in
response to commercial pressures such as the high cost of accidents or serious incidents, or consumer
resistance. Chapters 1, 4 and 5 contain additional information on acceptable levels of safety.
10.3 SAFETY OVERSIGHT
10.3.1 One of the cornerstones for effective safety management is a formal system for safety
oversight. Safety oversight involves regular (if not continuous) monitoring of all aspects of an organization’s
operations. On the surface, safety oversight demonstrates compliance with State and organization rules,
10-4 Safety Management Manual (SMM)
regulations, standards, procedures, etc. However, its value goes much deeper. Monitoring provides another
method for proactive hazard identification, validation of the effectiveness of safety actions taken, and the
continuing evaluation of safety performance.
10.3.2 As mentioned in 5.3.1 c), safety oversight is considered to be a function of the State as the
regulator, while safety performance monitoring is carried out by operators and service providers. The
“monitoring” functions of safety oversight take many forms with varying degrees of formality.
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