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you may ask yourself why not let pilots become expert
computer operators? Well, consider the fact that
it will still be necessary for pilots to fly the aircraft
since automation and technology do fail.
THE CONTROVERSY
Contrary to popular belief, the problems associated
with the evolving glass cockpit and automation do not
begin and end in boredom. Numerous perceived or
potential problems that may arise in the new flight
deck environment have been studied over the years by
human factors specialists. Some of these problems
include:
increased monitoring requirements as flight crews
move from continuous manual control to supervisory
control (i.e. takeoff climb cruise)
increased training requirements - pilots need to
learn how to work and operated in the automated
environment
inappropriate levels of trust in automation - such
FSI - HUMAN FACTORS 4
as a total lack of trust leading senseless cross
checks, or total trust leading to complacency and a
lack of intervention when required
A recent survey of pilots conducted for the FAA identified
114 distinct perceived problems and concerns
with cockpit automation. Several of these were related
to mode complexity, the interaction of automation
modes, uncommanded mode transitions, and a lack of
mode awareness. In addition, problems such as being
unable to ascertain the mode or state of automation,
its configuration, current operations, and future behavior
were reported. This is the trademark of the
ever-evolving “glass cockpit.”
Should pilots be trained to become computer experts?
This is a possibility if we consider the cases involving
the A320 aircraft. A classic example of one of the
problems associated with highly automated aircraft is
that mode errors can and do occur.
If we go back the late 80s and early 90s to events involving
A320 aircraft, we see the problems and perception
errors between man and machine.
In July 1988, on approach to London Gatwick, an
A320 aircraft was programmed for a 3° flight path
but was in vertical speed mode, and, as a result, it
almost landed three miles short.
In June of 1990, while over San Diego, an A320
aircraft involving an unknown operator mistakenly
set a 3000 ft / minute decent while in the vertical
speed mode. The aircraft was suppose to
have set a 3° flight path, and therefore descended
well below profile and minimum altutidude.
In Janurary 1992, on approach to Strasbourg, an
Air Inter flight crew member inadvertantly slected
a 3300 ft / minute decent rate instead of a 3.3°
flight path resulting in a fatal crash
Should the pilots be blamed for these types of errors?
Today, technology is very flexible; this has allowed
designers to produce an ever increasing range of tools
to optimize performance. However, this flexibility
creates and multiplies various modes of operation that
are attention demanding for a pilot. In the case of the
A320, a pilot may enter a desired vertical speed or
flight path angle using the same display. System interpretation
of the entered value depends on the active
display mode. Although these values are flagged on
the display, they tend to look the same on the display.
Therefore:
in order to operate safely, flight crews must be
aware of the possibility of the different modes
fight crews must know the implications of an improper
selection
flight crews must correctly interpret the displayed
target values with respect to the active mode.
Air Inter Flight 148 CFIT: 87 fatalities, 9 survivors
Flight Deck - Airbus A320
FSI - HUMAN FACTORS 5
Also the flight node annunciator that provides the
necessary feedback about mode status is not always
conspicuous. To make things worse, designers occasionally
remove other instrumentation that may convey
system status in their development process. Unfortunately
for pilots, this type of problem is usually
exasperated in the multi-stressor environment of the
cockpit.
How may pilot interface be improved?
Several simple methods include to improving the interface
includes:
eliminating aircraft subsystems that allow for simultaneous
use by multiple pilots
providing salient feedback about their mode status
and mode transition
not overloading their available attention resources
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