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awareness of problems through which
such occurrences may be prevented in
the future. Accident/incident briefs are
based on preliminary information from government
agencies, aviation organizations, press information
and other sources. This information may
not be entirely accurate.
Crew Receives ‘Sink Rate’
Warning
Boeing 737. No damage. No injuries.
The fl ight crew intended to conduct a visual
approach to an airport in Australia that had
visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The report
said that the crew were aware of a notice to
airmen (NOTAM) advising that the instrument
landing system (ILS) glideslope signal for Runway
23 was being tested and was not to be used for
navigation.
The report said that after receiving a request to
make the ILS Runway 23 localizer available for
a training flight, the maintenance technicians
had released the localizer for operational use
while continuing pre-calibration testing of the
glideslope.
“Consequently, the [localizer] (with the ILS
identification code) was serviceable while the
[glideslope] was operating intermittently and not
available for operational use,” the report said.
The fi rst offi cer was fl ying the aircraft on autopilot.
During the turn onto fi nal approach, the
crew observed that the fl ight instruments indicated
that the ILS was operating. The approach
controller then told the crew, “You should get
visual shortly, but you’re cleared for the 23 ILS
approach.”
The report said, “The controller later reported that
at the time, the fact that the glide[slope] was not
available had slipped his mind and he reverted to
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT BRIEFS
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A C C I D E N T S / I N C I D E N T S
his normal radiotelephony phraseology for aircraft
on fi nal. The inadvertent slip by the approach controller
was the fi nal action of a number of lapses
or omissions that led the pilots to believe that the
ILS was available, despite previous advice.”
The fl ight crew decided to continue the approach
with the autopilot coupled to the ILS. About 20
seconds after the autopilot captured the glideslope
signal, the aircraft began to descend rapidly, and
the terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS)
issued a “sink rate” warning.
The captain assumed control of the aircraft and
decreased the descent rate. During this time, the
TAWS issued a “pull up” warning.
“The [captain] reported that because they were
visual and there were no terrain concerns, he used
minimal control inputs during the recovery from
the descent,” the report said. “Information from
the aircraft’s fl ight data recorder indicated that
the maximum rate of descent was 6,100 feet per
minute and that [the aircraft] had descended to
a radio altitude of 1,180 feet above ground level
(2,000 feet above mean sea level) before resuming
the approach profi le.”
Reverse Thrust Worsens
Directional Control Problem
McDonnell Douglas MD-82. No damage.
No injuries.
The fl ight crew were cleared to conduct an
instrument landing system (ILS) approach
to Runway 13 at an airport in Indonesia at night.
Visibility was four kilometers (two statute miles)
with light rain, and surface winds were from 050
degrees at eight knots.
The airplane was at 2,000 feet and about 19 kilometers
(10 nautical miles) from the airport when
the crew observed the runway. The airplane was
landed in the touchdown zone of the runway
and decelerated normally. At about 60 knots to
80 knots, the airplane began to drift slowly right.
The pilot fl ying applied left rudder and set the
thrust reversers to a maximum engine pressure
ratio (EPR) of 2.0.
Both pilots applied maximum wheel braking,
but the airplane continued to drift toward the
right side of the runway. The pilot fl ying told the
pilot not fl ying to call out “brace for impact” on
the public-address system. The airplane came to
a stop with the right main landing gear about
one meter (three feet) off the right side of the
runway.
The pilot fl ying told the cabin attendants that an
emergency evacuation was not required and to
evacuate through the left front door.
The incident report said that the aircraft operating
manual (AOM) prohibited use of more than
reverse-idle thrust below 60 knots on a wet runway.
The AOM said, “If diffi culty in maintaining
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