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This Roadmap is meant to complement ongoing Service efforts to redefine their roles and missions for
handling 21st century contingencies. The Services see UAS as integral components of their future tactical
formations. As an example, the Army’s current transformation initiative envisions each Brigade Combat
Team having a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron equipped with an
UAS, reflecting the initiative’s emphasis on reducing weight, increasing agility, and integrating robotics
in their future forces.
1.2 SCOPE
OSD, as part of its oversight responsibilities for Defense-wide acquisition and technology, intends this
Roadmap to be strong guidance in such cross-program areas as standards development and other
interoperability solutions. It neither authorizes specific UAS nor prioritizes the requirements, as this is
the responsibility of the Services and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). It does,
however, identify future windows when technology should become available to enable new capabilities,
linked to warfighters’ needs, to be incorporated into current or planned UAS. Many of the technologies
discussed in this document are currently maturing in defense research laboratories and contractor
facilities. The Roadmap span of 25 years was chosen to accommodate what typically constitutes a
generation of aircraft and payload technology, from laboratory project to fielded system. The information
presented in this study is current as of March 30, 2005. Programmatic information is current as of
February 7, 2005 when the FY06 President’s Budget went to Congress.
1.3 DEFINITIONS
Cruise missile weapons are occasionally confused with UA weapon systems because they are both
unmanned. The key discriminators are (1) UA are equipped and intended for recovery at the end of their
flight, and cruise missiles are not, and (2) munitions carried by UA are not tailored and integrated into
their airframe whereas the cruise missile’s warhead is. This distinction is clearly made in the Joint
Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary’s definition for “UAV” (or UA).
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide
vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can
carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery
projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles.
1.4 WHY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT?
The familiar saying that UA are better suited for "dull, dirty, or dangerous" missions than manned aircraft
presupposes that man is (or should be) the limiting factor in performing certain airborne roles. Although
any flight can be dull or dangerous at times, man continues to fly such missions, whether because of
SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION
Page 1
UAS ROADMAP 2005
tradition or as a substitute for technology inadequacies. The following examples validate this saying.
The Dull
B-2 crews flew 30-hour roundtrip missions from Missouri to Serbia during 34 days of the Kosovo conflict
in 1999. The normal two-man crews were augmented with a third pilot, but even so, fatigue management
was the dominant concern of unit commanders, who estimated 40-hour missions would have been their
crews’ maximum. The post-Kosovo RAND assessment states “…the crew ratio of two two-man crews
per aircraft might need to be increased to four crews or else provisions made [for foreign basing.] A
serious limiting factor…is that doubling the B-2’s crew ratio would require either doubling the number of
training sorties and hours flown by the Air Force’s limited B-2 inventory or reducing the number of
sorties and flying hours made available to each B-2 crew member—to a point where their operational
proficiency and expertise would be unacceptably compromised.” Contrast this short term imposition on
crew endurance with the nearly continuous string of day-long MQ-1 missions over Afghanistan and Iraq
that have been flown by stateside crews operating on a four-hour duty cycle for nearly two years.
The Dirty
The Air Force and the Navy used unmanned B-17s and F6Fs, respectively, from 1946 to 1948 to fly into
nuclear clouds within minutes after bomb detonation to collect radioactive samples, clearly a dirty
mission. Returning UA were washed down by hoses and their samples removed by cherrypicker-type
mechanical arms to minimize the exposure of ground crew to radioactivity. In 1948, the Air Force
decided the risk to aircrews was "manageable," and replaced the UA with manned F-84s whose pilots
wore 60-pound lead suits. Some of these pilots subsequently died due to being trapped by their lead suits
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