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Robust, anti-jam, data links are required.
Reactive SEAD will require low latency human interaction with the system – or high autonomy
within the system for determination of ROE criteria.
Reactive SEAD implies the integration of manned and unmanned aircraft in a single strike event.
Strike/SEAD summary. The era of UA contribution to strike missions has arrived and SEAD missions
are just dawning with the J-UCAS program. Availability will add new options in the application of force,
and promises to reduce the cost of our armed forces. It should be noted, that for the foreseeable future
UA are not a complete replacement for manned aircraft. UA can bring enhancements to mission
capability (e.g. risk-free close approach to heavily defended targets) but will continue to only satisfy a
portion of the many missions strike assets cover. Close air support is an example of one such area where
the use of a UA to deliver ordnance in very close proximity to friendly forces will face technical,
employment, and cultural barriers that imply that manned aircraft programs must continue to provide the
solution, at least for the near- and mid-term. There will be an impact on the total numbers of manned
systems that must be acquired.
Electronic Attack
EA is the use of electromagnetic energy to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum and employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy
as their primary destructive mechanism. Many of the attributes that make UA attractive for SEAD also
make them attractive for the EA mission because UA can theoretically achieve levels of survivability that
manned aircraft cannot. Signature control without the need for human caretaking becomes less difficult.
Additionally, maneuverability could be increased beyond human tolerances to enhance survivability.
Finally, as stated before, should survivability measures fail, the use of an unmanned system removes the
risk of losing a human life – arguably one of the strongest reasons for using a UA in a combat situation.
Many challenges remain for developers and tacticians, but the EA mission is being considered for both
the Air Force’s and Navy’s J-UCAS. EA concepts of employment may include jamming or employment
UAS ROADMAP 2005
APPENDIX A – MISSIONS
Page A-7
of expendables. In developing unmanned systems for the EA mission, the following attributes are being
considered:
The ability to build a very stealthy unmanned vehicle could mean closer approaches to targeted
systems, requiring less radiated power to complete the EA mission, and the ability to detect and
exploit much lower levels of targeted system radiation.
The potential use of high power directed energy (DE) weapons or electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)
weapons in future EA missions argues for the use of an unmanned platform, since the weapon may
pose a significant risk to the crew of any delivery vehicle.
The use of unmanned systems in the EA mission also brings several challenges:
When using EA to neutralize defenses in support of manned strike forces it will be critical for the
SEAD UA to be within sufficient range to be effective. A trade-off between EA effectiveness and
survivability needs to be fully understood in a systems engineering trade.
An UA is more dependent upon outside communications than manned systems. Self-jamming
(interference with command and control communications by electronic attack emissions) could limit
the ability to change the unmanned system’s planned mission once the electronic attack has begun.
• The potential for self-jamming and increased vulnerability due to a dependence upon
communications mean a great degree of autonomy will be required in the unmanned EA system.
A manned EA aircraft provides the ability for a trained crew to evaluate large amounts of tactical data
on the threat environment and to change the mission plan as required for strike support. The
appearance of previously unknown threat defensive system modes, frequencies, or tactics may only
be detected by the human operator’s ability to recognize patterns in the context of previous
experience – a very difficult, and as yet undeveloped, ability for autonomous systems.
• Without the development of autonomous EA operating capability, the transmission of large
amounts of data, describing the tactical environment, must be provided to remote human
operators in real time. These large transmissions would be limited by available bandwidth and
self-jamming and could increase the unmanned system’s vulnerability.
A signature-controlled vehicle loses the advantage of stealth when radiating. “Home On Jam” threat
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