曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
Cluster 1
AMF JTRS
MIDS JTRS
Vehicular and Rotary Wing Platforms
(i.e. FIreScout)
IOC
IOC
Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Applications
Link 16, TACAN and Digital Voice
IOC
Cluster 1 NSA Certification
AMF JTRS
MIDS JTRS NSA Certification
Contract Award PDR CDR Key Decision Point
LRIP
FIGURE C-11. CONSOLIDATED HIGH LEVEL PROGRAM SCHEDULE.
TSAT
DoD relies extensively on SATCOM for UA command and control as well as product dissemination.
Reliance on foreign commercial vendors, however, entails some risk. A government owned, broadband,
SATCOM constellation will reduce reliance on commercial SATCOM and provide more available and
cost effective BLOS communications support to UA operations. For a more complete description of
current UA communications, refer to the section entitled “Historical Perspective,” and its discussions of
Global Hawk and Predator operations.
The TSAT constellation implements the space borne component of the GIG, moving data globally
through an orbiting optical and RF based network. The first TSAT is scheduled for launch in FY13
(CY12). An additional TSAT will be launched each year until all 5 TSAT systems are established in their
geosynchronous orbits (Figure C-11). TSAT will connect to the terrestrial backbone via teleports located
at strategic points throughout the globe. TSAT will be transparent to most GIG users, and be experienced
simply as a high data rate transfer capability.
UAS, such as Global Hawk and Predator, will connect to TSAT directly through the FAB-T, which
include both RF and Optical data links.
High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryption Devices
The principal objective of Information Assurance is to assure access to authorized users while denying
access to unauthorized users. For example, imagery exploiters and operations center personnel may need
UA data, but a medical technician does not. Historically the separation has been accomplished through
physically securing the classified networks, and encrypting the information as it leaves the protected
facility. Circuits that transfer unencrypted classified information are designated red in security
accreditation plans. Circuits carrying unclassified information or encrypted classified information are
designated black. Open connections between red circuits and black circuits are prohibited. This principle
of red/black separation guides the design and implementation of classified information processing
facilities.
A variation on the idea of red/black separation, and a fundamental tenet of the GIG, is the concept of red
edge/black core. Information created in classified enclaves (red edge) is encrypted and sent across the
GIG as unclassified (black core) information. This concept allows all information to traverse the web
through any available series of networks, regardless of encryption schemes employed.
Some daunting architectural challenges must be overcome in order to achieve red edge/black core. One
issue has to do with embedded enclaves, which under the current architecture would require successive
UAS ROADMAP 2005
APPENDIX C - COMMUNICATIONS
Page C-23
decryption and encryption across the GIG. This would increase latency and add potential points of failure
to the path.
NSA oversees development of HAIPE devices and the HAIPE Interoperability Specification (HAIPIS).
The HAIPE device will be installed between a classified (red) processing node or network and the
unclassified (black) networks of the GIG. Ultimately, HAIPE devices will be integrated into all systems,
pushing the red boundary as close to the classified source as possible. UA sensors will be an important
source of such classified information (i.e. imagery, SIGINT, MASINT). Therefore, UA systems that
create classified information must integrate HAIPE devices as they become available.
NEXT STEPS
Aside from written guidance and existing programs meant to bring UA communications into the netcentric
vision, specific steps can be taken now, to eliminate obstructions to broad based information
sharing and facilitate UA systems integration into the GIG. Some of the actions have been noted earlier
in the text but are repeated here for emphasis and to provide a consolidated list. Failure to implement any
of these will significantly limit a UA system’s ability to share information across the GIG.
Embrace DoD approved net-centric products. Focus resources on moving toward GIG compliance
rather than justifying waiver requests for legacy hardware and software.
Develop Net-Ready Key Performance Parameters (NR-KPP).
Perform GIG Capstone Requirements Document (GIG CRD) crosswalk as specified in the GIG CRD.
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