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master arm switch, is a concern of the Non-Nuclear Munitions Safety Board (NNMSB). It addresses how
to remotely arm a weapon as well as the more difficult issue of how to return the master arm from on-tooff
following weapon release or in the event of lost link. To date, company proprietary, system-specific
software has been used to provide this function.
Weaponization Issues
1. SEEK EAGLE, an Air Force chartered organization that certifies aircraft-stores for all weapons, may
impose unnecessary testing on UA weapon systems, especially where risk to aircrew is a factor.
This could impact UAS development costs and schedules.
2. The proliferation of system-specific Master Arm software routines will greatly complicate stores
certification on various types of UA.
Weaponization Goals
1. SEEK EAGLE testing criteria should be examined from the perspective of employing stores from
unmanned aircraft and revised as necessary.
2. A standard for Master Arm software should be developed and weaponized UA required to comply
with it.
5.5 OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS
Seventy percent of non-combat aircraft losses are attributed to human error, and a large percentage of the
remaining losses have this as a contributing factor. Although aircraft are modified, training emphasized,
and procedures changed as a result of these accidents, the percentage attributed to the operator remains
fairly unchanged. Five factors should combine in unmanned operations to significantly reduce the human
error percentage.
First, UA today have demonstrated the ability to operate completely autonomously from takeoff through
roll out after landing; Global Hawk is one example. Software-based performance, unlike its human
counterpart, is guaranteed to be repeatable when circumstances are repeated. With each UA accident, the
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UAS ROADMAP 2005
aircraft’s software can be modified to remedy the situation causing the latest mishap, “learning” the
corrective action indelibly. Although software maturity induces its own errors over time, in the long-term
this process could asymptotically reduce human-error induced losses to near zero. Losses due to
mechanical failures will still occur because no design or manufacturing process produces perfect parts.
Second, the need to conduct training and proficiency sorties with unmanned aircraft actually flying could
be reduced in the near term with high fidelity simulators. Such simulations could become
indistinguishable from actual sorties to the UA operator with the use of virtual reality-based simulators,
explored by AFRL, and physiologically-based technology, like the Tactile Situation Awareness System
(TSAS). The Navy Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory (NAMRL) developed TSAS to reduce
operator saturation by visual information. It has been tested in various manned aircraft and has potential
applicability for UA operators. The system uses a vest with air-actuated tactors to tap the user in the
direction of drift, gravity, roll; the tempo of the tapping indicates the rate of drift. Results have shown
that use of the TSAS increases operator situational awareness and reduces workload.
Third, UA control stations could double as simulators to perform mission rehearsal thus eliminating the
expense of developing and maintaining separate simulators, as is the case for manned aircraft. However,
when numbers of ground stations are determined to meet operational requirements, adding training
requirements will increase that number since simultaneous use in operations and for simulation may not
be consistent with flight certification and airworthiness criteria.
Fourth, with such simulators, the level of flying training required by UA can be reduced, potentially
resulting in reduced maintenance hours, fewer aircraft losses, and lowered attrition expenditures. Of 301
total U.S. F-16 losses to date, 6 have been in combat and the rest (98 percent) in training accidents. While
some level of actual UA flying will be required to train manned aircraft crews in executing cooperative
missions with UA, a substantial reduction in peacetime UA attrition losses can probably be achieved.
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UAS ROADMAP 2005
6.0 ROADMAP
This Section brings together the requirements and desired capabilities (Section 3) with emerging
technological (Section 4) and operational opportunities (Section 5) in an effort to stimulate the planning
process for UAS development over the next 25 years. It attempts, through a limited number of examples,
to demonstrate a process for selecting opportunities for solving selected shortfalls in capability and
incorporating these solutions in Service UAS programs (see Figures 6.1-1 and 6.2-1). Two Roadmaps,
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