曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
stalling speeds by as much as 50 knots. In this
case, the result was that the rear-engined,
high-tailed tri-jet entered a deep stall. This
was caused by the high set elevators losing
effectiveness being, as they were, in the wake
turbulence behind the stalled wings due to the
high nose up attitude. As subsequently
demonstrated in a simulator, recovery from
such a situation at that low altitude proved
well nigh impossible.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
investigators, increasingly aware of the
importance of the atmosphere prevailing on a
flight deck, attributed the premature flap retraction
to be directly linked to the domineering,
uncompromising attitude of the captain.
It was reasoned that if he had been more cooperative
and inadvertently – in the state of
mind in which he might have been following
the pre-departure altercation – called for flaps
up, this would have been queried by a first
officer who had not been intimidated.
LUCKY ESCAPES
A further example of this occurred during a
Lufthansa 747 taking off from Nairobi.
Before being modified, probably as a result
of this very accident, the only indication of
leading edge device position was on the flight
engineer's panel, the pilot's panel indicator
showing only trailing edge flap position.
Once again, the atmosphere on the flight
deck appeared to have been anything but cordial,
and during the pre-take-off check, the
flight engineer failed to notice that all the
leading edge devices were not extended.
The result of this was that, although the aircraft
may have briefly lifted off the tarmac, it
promptly fell back and ended up off the end of
the runway with surprisingly few casualties
under the circumstances.
Closer to home, however, this problem,
unrecognised at the time, could have manifested
itself much earlier than this – in the
early 1960s in fact – not many months after
CAPTAINS NOT SO COURAGEOUS – PART 1
62 World Airnews, June 2005.
“There was no need to shine
his torch into the darkened
compartment below the flight
deck floor because all that he
could see below were the lights
of Nairobi...”
the introduction of the Boeing 707, when the
national airline survived two extremely lucky
narrow escapes followed by two tragedies,
none of which could reasonably have been
attributed to anything but pilot error.
With the advent of the 707, so in awe were
the authorities of this airline of the big new jet,
more than twice the weight and speed of anything
hitherto operated by the carrier, that they
chose to crew it with not one, but two captains
in addition to a senior first officer, himself
highly experienced and due for command,
plus a flight engineer.
The wisdom of this nose heavy crew structure
was debatable and not popular with most
pilots. As one of those erstwhile senior first
officers, I bore mute witness to more than one
altercation between captains on the flight deck.
In the first of these lucky escapes, a mere
four months after the airline's first 707 route
flight, details of which are repeated from conversation
with the flight engineer involved
shortly afterwards, it appeared that the aircraft
was descending into Nairobi's Ndjili (later to
become Jomo Kenyatta) airport at night. In
good visibility and with a light north-easterly
wind, they were cleared for a visual approach
to runway 06.
In order to position for a wide, easy base leg
for that runway, it was common practice to
head for 'GG' beacon, situated in the notorious
Ngong hills, some 15 miles west of the airport,
which had seen the demise of many an ill-fated
aircraft and its occupants, and which rise to
8 074 feet above sea level. This is a treacherous
1 647 feet above the airfield elevation.
After nearing 'GG', (minimum safe sector
altitude 9 600 ft) the aircraft either intercept
the instrument landing system or proceed with
a visual approach on to the runway.
Since the approach to runway 06 is over
sparsely populated terrain including a game
park, there is little or no visual reference to the
ground on dark nights, and the normal procedure
would be to depart ‘GG’ at not less than
9 600 feet whereafter further descent would be
regulated in accordance with the instrument
approach procedure.
On this occasion, however, there might
well have been a certain amount of complacency
on the flight deck, for with the lights of
the city in sight in the distance, they failed to
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
航空资料28(102)
