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8 Issue Number 6
Close Proximity of Light Aircraft. The policy of
parking of light aircraft “tail-to” turbojet aircraft on
ramps, or in areas adjacent to congested ramps, appeared
to invite jet blast damage incidents. In a number
of instances, commuter planes occupying the same
ramp area as turbojets were the targets of jet blast:
✍ “During a wait for load advisory message, the
aircraft was taxied to a position on ramp near other
aircraft…The Ground controller did advise us to use
minimum thrust when departing ramp. With 2 engines
running, aircraft moved only 15-20 yards before
slowly coming to a stop. The number 2 engine
was called to be started and with all 3 running, even
then slightly above idle thrust was needed to move
up and around another aircraft parked in front of
us…The next day the Captain was notified by company
channels that a twin-engine commuter aircraft
had been blown/slid into adjacent baggage carts
causing some aircraft damage.” (ACN 228844)
In cases where a mixture of different aircraft sizes on
the ramp could not be avoided, it appeared important
that adequate space be left between turbojets and smaller
commuter or corporate aircraft, and that ground crews
carefully monitor boarding and deboarding operations,
particularly those of the lighter aircraft:
✍ “Damage reported to small commuter aircraft
from blast of one engine at idle power as we pulled
into gate. With close proximity of small 2-engine
commuter aircraft and my LGT, they reported two
people fell down as a result of blast. If this is so as
stated, then obviously the area between large aircraft
and the small commuters is insufficient and the
situation must be remedied.” (ACN 180036)
It was also clear from reporters’ comments that airports’
ramp management policies could influence the
occurrence of jet blast damage incidents:
✍ “On taxi in to gate X…some tail damage was
done to a SMA, which was parked behind our aircraft
“tail to.” The close proximity of operations of turbojet
aircraft and light reciprocals was a strong contributing
factor. A minimum of four other incidents have
occurred on this ramp involving aircraft damaged by
turbojet blast.” (ACN 245389)
Ground Communication & Handling Procedures.
A final factor contributing to some ramp jet blast incidents
reported to ASRS was inadequate communication
between pilots and ATC regarding pushback and powerup,
or between flight and ground crews involved in
pushback activities. At some airports, initial pushback
communications are conducted on gate radio until the
aircraft is released to Ground Control. For at least one
reporter involved in a ramp jet blast incident, this
procedure was a contributing factor:
✍ “…At some point during pushback, the co-pilot
advised gate radio that we would need to draw power
or run up an engine to start the remaining engines.
This was acknowledged by gate radio. Number 4
engine was started at the gate due to an inop APU…A
company mechanic plugged in a headset and advised
us that a SMA had taxied in “close proximity” to our
rear and had been tipped onto a wing tip. He further
stated that the wing and prop had been
damaged…One contributing factor in this incident
is the present tower procedures which have all initial
pushback communications on gate radio until
“released to monitor Ground.” We (the pilots) and
Ground are not aware of what each other are or
might be doing. Unless gate radio advises the
Ground controller of our pushback and power up
needs, he may not be aware of a hazardous condition.”
(ACN 81873)
Issue Number 6 9
Table 2 — Source Of Jet Blast
Aircraft Type No. Rpts. % Data
LGT (Large Transport) 23 45
MLG (Medium Large Transport) 12 25
WDB (Widebody Transport) 13 24
HVT (Heavy Transport) 1 2
MDT (Medium Transport) 1 2
LTT (Light Transport) 1 2
Total 51 100%
More frequently, however, inadequate communications
between flight and ground crews, coupled with questionable
ground handling procedures, were responsible
for jet blast damage incidents. In some cases the miscommunication
was a result of an ambiguous or absent
signal by the ground crew:
✍ “I made a normal departure from gate. Used
normal power pull away. Ground personnel made no
indication of anything abnormal. On taxi I saw a
small aircraft had been blown over…” (ACN 50621)
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