曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
halfway across the WDB pushed up his power to
begin his takeoff roll. His jet blast blew me off the
runway into a grass area…The prop tips were damaged
on the taxi lights and the left wing came in
contact with the ground and was bent…I was not
aware that his jet blast would render an aircraft the
size of mine so helpless.” (ACN 253191)
6 Issue Number 6
The Captain of the widebody aircraft involved in this
incident had several suggestions for preventing jet
blast damage during night operations:
✍ “…I think the SMT [small transport] should
have waited until our liftoff at least before crossing,
or Tower should have withheld clearance for some
specified distance on our takeoff roll. Remaining jet
blast is very hard to estimate at night and timed or
distance separation before light aircraft cross is the
only solution.” (ACN 253191)
Several broad themes emerged from this group of reports:
1) The danger of performing engine tests and run-ups
when jet blast is directed across active taxiways and
runways;
2) The need for Tower and Ground Controllers to
carefully monitor jet blast hazard, specifically the
direction of jet engine exhaust.
Both themes were dramatically evident in this controller’s
report of a large jet’s engine run-up calamity:
✍ “Air carrier LGT [large transport] called Ground
Control for a full power engine runup at the gate.
Ground Control advised him he would have to go to
the jet runup area…The heading for aircraft operating
in this area is 220 degrees…Ground Control
advised the heading, the LGT complied. As the LGT
made his full power runup, the Ground controller
observed a cloud of dust several hundred feet in the
air and debris blowing on the departure end of the
runway in use (up to 1500 feet). The Ground controller
immediately called the aircraft to cease runup.
After 2 or 3 calls the aircraft complied. When the
dust and debris cleared, the damage that was done
was the complete destruction of the localizer…If the
county…continues to use this area for maintenance
runup, they should install a blast fence…” (ACN 124003)
Several pilots admonished Ground Control for not monitoring
run-ups of larger aircraft more carefully, and for
failing to provide light aircraft with warnings of jet
blast hazard:
✍ “Ground Control cleared me to taxi to my parking
area. I was following my clearance to taxi and
approximately 600 feet down the taxiway, my aircraft
was caught in a jet blast produced by an aircraft
testing its engines in a run-up area. The force of the
jet blast caused excessive lateral force on the left
main gear of my aircraft causing it to collapse…No
warning was given me by Ground Control. The
aircraft doing the run-up was in contact with Ground
Control and was not asked to reduce power…Ground
Control [should] instruct all aircraft in the run-up
area to direct their blast away from the taxi area
instead of across it…” (ACN 133597)
In a similar incident, a small aircraft performing a runup
150 feet behind, and to the side of, an airliner holding
short of the runway, experienced a wing and prop strike
when the larger aircraft powered up. The pilot of the
small plane had succinct advice for both the jet crew and
ATC:
✍ “Causes: 1) the jet should not perform engine
checks/run-ups on a taxiway without contacting
Ground Control. 2) ATC should warn heavy aircraft
about smaller aircraft behind them.” (ACN 156166)
On the Ramp: Position Engines
Fifty-three percent of the jet blast damage incidents
reported to ASRS occurred on an airport ramp during
pushback, powerback, taxi-out, or taxi-in. Several different
factors appeared to influence these events. The
most significant was the position of jet engines in
relation to gates, ground equipment, people, and other
aircraft on the ramp when breakaway power was applied.
Another prominent factor was the proximity of
light aircraft, including commuter-type aircraft, on or
near ramps with turbojet operations. A final element
was ground handling procedures, including gate radio
communications and disposition of baggage carts.
Issue Number 6 7
Power + Turns = Hazard. More than a third of the jet
blast ramp incidents involved aircraft that had engines
powered and were turning 45 degrees or more. In a few
cases, not even the use of a tractor or tug prevented jet
blast damage if engines were running, and an aircraft
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