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requires a substantial
amount of conscious processing
because it involves
novelty; we do not know
what the other person is going
to say and we have to
formulate unique responses
appropriate to the discussion.
In contrast, an experienced
pilot can manually fly
a familiar aircraft in a largely
automatic fashion. However,
certain subtasks embedded
in the act of flying manually
require conscious attention.
For example, leveling off at
an assigned altitude requires
consciously monitoring the
Issue Number 10 7
altimeter to read the numbers
and to match the current
altitude with the assigned
altitude the pilot is
holding in memory.
The framework outlined
above allows some general
conclusions about the circumstances
under which two
tasks may be performed concurrently.
A task requiring a
high degree of conscious
processing, FMS programming,
for example, cannot
be performed concurrently
with other tasks without risking
error. Two tasks that are
largely automated can be
performed together reliably if
they are regularly practiced
in conjunction, for example,
flying the aircraft manually
and intercepting the localizer.
We are less certain how
well individuals can combine
two tasks, each of which involves
a mixture of conscious
and automatic processing,
for example, searching for
traffic while monitoring for
altitude capture. We suspect
that pilots can learn to integrate
two tasks of this sort
and achieve reliable performance,
but only if they regularly
practice the two tasks in
conjunction. This, however,
is speculation, and requires
experimental research for
validation. _
* Norman, D. J. and Shallice,
T. (1986). Attention to action:
willed and automatic
control of behavior. In R. J.
Deardin, G. E. Schwartz, and
D. Shaprio (Eds), Consciousness
and Self-Regulation, Advances
in Research and
Theory (pp 1-18). New York:
Plenum.
ing the airplane while the other troubleshoots
and state clearly who will do
what, 2) strictly adhere to company procedures."
(# 404306)
In 13 incidents crews failed to reset
their altimeters when passing through
the transition altitude (18,000 feet
MSL in the United States and Canada).
It is especially easy to forget to reset
altimeters if this action is not linked
in pilots’ minds to other actions. (For
this reason some pilots make resetting
altimeters part of a cluster of action
items they routinely perform together,
e.g., making a passenger announcement
and turning on the seat belt
sign. Some companies make resetting
altimeters part of the descent checklist.)
In principle, the problem is
similar to that of monitoring for
altitude level-off, except more vulnerable
to error. In air carrier operations
the crew is normally aided with
altitude level-off by altitude alerting
devices and by the formal procedure
of making a thousand-foot call,
confirmed by both pilots, before
reaching the assigned altitude.
Two of the crews reporting to ASRS
thought that they forgot to reset their
altimeters stated they were preoccupied
with an abnormal situation.
Altogether, abnormals were a factor in
19 of the 107 incidents. Ironically, it
seems that one of the biggest hazards
of abnormals is becoming distracted
from other cockpit duties. Abnormals
easily preempt crews’ attention for
several reasons. Recognizing the
cockpit warning indicators, identifying
the nature of the problem, and
choosing the correct procedure require
considerable attention. Crews have
much less opportunity to practice
abnormal procedures than normal
procedures, so choosing and running
the appropriate checklists requires
more effort and greater concentration
of mental resources than running
normal checklists. Also, in situations
perceived to be urgent or threatening,
the normal human response is to
narrow the focus of attention, which
unfortunately tends to diminish mental
flexibility and reduce ability to analyze
and resolve non-routine situations.
Abnormals = Distractions
8 Issue Number 10
Strategies for Reducing Vulnerability to Interruptions and Distractions
We suggest several lines of defense against the types of crew errors described
above. These are not perfect, but in combination they should, in our opinion,
reduce crews’ vulnerability to error.
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