曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
or operations and prevent execution of safety-critical functions as a result.
· The system should alert the operator to an erroneous entry or operation.
· Alerts should be designed such that routine alerts are readily distinguished from safetycritical
alerts.
· Safety-critical computing system functions should have one and only one possible path
leading to their execution.
· Files used to store safety-critical data should be unique and should have a single purpose.
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 13: Launch Safety
December 30, 2000
13 -
29
· The software should be annotated, designed, and documented for ease of analysis,
maintenance, and testing of future changes to the software. Safety-critical variables should be
identified in such a manner that they can be readily distinguished from non-safety-critical
variables.
Configuration Control
The overall System Configuration Management Plan should provide for the establishment of a Software
Configuration Control Board (SCCB) prior to the establishment of the initial baseline. The SCCB should
review and approve all software changes (modifications and updates) occurring after the initial baseline is
been established.
The software system safety program plan should provide for a thorough configuration management
process that includes version identification, access control, change audits, and the ability to restore
previous revisions of the system.
Modified software or firmware should be clearly identified with the version of the modification, including
configuration control information. Both physical and electronic “fingerprinting” of the version are
encouraged.
Testing
Systematic and thorough testing should provide evidence for critical software assurance. Software test
results should be analyzed to identify potential safety anomalies that may occur. The applicant should use
independent test planning, execution, and review for critical software. Software system testing should
exercise a realistic sample of expected operational inputs. Software testing should include boundary, outof-
bounds and boundary crossing test conditions. At a minimum, software testing should include
minimum and maximum input data rates in worst case configurations to determine the system capabilities
and responses to these conditions. Software testing should include duration stress testing. The stress test
time should be continued for at least the maximum expected operation time for the system. Testing should
be conducted under simulated operational environments. Software qualification and acceptance testing
should be conducted for safety-critical functions.
References:
AST Licensing And Safety Division Directive No. 001, Licensing Process and Procedures dated March
15, 1996.
FAA Advisory Circular AC 431-01, Reusable Launch Vehicle System Safety Process, dated April 1999
(Draft)
Code of Federal Regulations, Commercial Space Transportation, Department of Transportation Title 14,
Federal Aviation Administration, Chapter III, Part 415 – Launch Licenses, and Part 431 – Launch and
Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV)
FAA Advisory Circular AC 431-03, Software System Safety (Draft)
System Safety Society, System Safety Handbook, 2nd Edition, dated July 1997
Joint Software System Safety Committee Software System Safety Handbook
Eastern and Western Range Safety Requirements, EWR 127-1.
The Application of System Safety to the Commercial Launch Industry Licensing Process, FAA/ASY
Safety Risk Assessment News Reports No. 97-4 and 97-5
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 14: System Safety Training
December 30, 2000
14 -
1
Chapter 14: System Safety Training
14.1 TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS............................................................................................. 2
14.2 TASK ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................... 4
14.3 LEARNING OBJECTIVES..................................................................................................... 5
14.4 DELIVERING EFFECTIVE SAFETY TRAINING............................................................. 13
14.5 LEARNING STYLES ............................................................................................................ 14
14.6 SOURCES FOR SYSTEM SAFETY TRAINING................................................................ 15
FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 14: System Safety Training
December 30, 2000
14 -
2
14.0 System Safety Training1
System Safety Training is one of the key elements within a System Safety Program. To conduct a
中国航空网 www.aero.cn
航空翻译 www.aviation.cn
本文链接地址：
System Safety Handbook系统安全手册上(46)
