1. FACTUAL INFORMATION.
1.1. History of the flight.
The aircraft was owned by GATX Leasing and operated by Leisure
International Airways. In the event flight, the aircraft was operating a
passenger holiday charter flight on behalf of Sabre Airways, flight number
SBE-4064, from Manchester to Ibiza.
The flight deck crew were normally based at London Gatwick Airport
and reported for duty there at 18.00 hrs UTC in order to be positioned by air to
Manchester to operate the flight to Ibiza. The cabin staff were all based at
Manchester.
On arrival at the aircraft, the commander noted that there were three
items in the Deferred Defect section of the Technical Log, but these were not
relevant to the flight or the subsequent event.
Boarding progressed slightly slower than normal, with the result that
the flight departed at 22.30 hrs, some 15 minutes behind the planned schedule.
Two pilots, five cabin crew and 180 passengers were on board.
After pushback and engine start, the crew noted a brief ECAM
(Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring) message: 'Digital Flight Data
Recorder Fault', but this condition was only transient.
The take-off, departure and cruise phases were uneventful. The
handling pilot for the sector was the first officer; this was decided during the
pre-flight briefing, given the good meteorological conditions expected at
destination.
As soon as the Ibiza METAR had been obtained, while still in the
cruise phase, the first officer planned for an ILS approach to Runway 24, set up
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the navigation aids and programmed the Flight Management Guidance
Computers (FMGC's) accordingly. He pre-selected the BSCU (Brake and
Steering Control Unit) Autobrake system to Low. Upon this selection, a
'BRAKES BSCU CH 2 FAULT' was annunciated to the crew. There was no
ECAM procedure to be followed. The selection was repeated but the fault
remained. The Status Page displayed ‘Inop Sys BSCU2 Fault’ (‘Inoperative
System, BSCU Channel 2 Fault’). The crew checked the relevant section of the
Flight Crew Operating Manual Volume 3 and this stated that the indication was
for 'Crew Awareness'. No further crew action was specified.
There were no further abnormal indications present. A normal ILS
approach was conducted. The first radio contact with Ibiza approach at 119.8
MHz ocurred at 00.35 hrs. The aircraft was already established at ILS a 10 Nm
from the VOR-DME of Ibiza-IBA. At 00.46:36 hrs they were authorised to
land on Runway 24, wind of 020º direction and 5 Kts velocity.
The aircraft made the flare and a gentle touchdown about 800 metres
from the start of Runway 24. A slight tailwind component was apparent, of
approx. 4 kt. Reverse thrust was selected and initial deceleration appeared
normal. The commander considered that more braking was required in order to
slow the aircraft to achieve the planned turn off the runway, so he advised the
first officer to apply more braking.
The first officer tried to apply more braking but found this ineffective.
He informed the commander of this and, around 80 kt, the first officer reduced
reverse thrust. The commander immediately took control, reapplied reverse
thrust and attempted to apply the brakes. He too found that there was no
braking available. Therefore, the commander began to swerve the aircraft each
way in an attempt to increase the available braking distance and slow the
aircraft down by lateral skidding before reaching the end of the runway, with
the tyres leaving rubber marks on the runway surface.
The aircraft left the end of the runway, entering the paved stopway
(SWY) and then into and beyond the 60-m overrun area (CWY). The
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commander was familiar with Ibiza Airport and knew of the presence of the
aerodrome boundary wall and the Mediterranean Sea beyond it. He therefore
elected to turn the aircraft to the right to remain within the aerodrome
boundary. The nose landing gear collapsed as the aircraft ran on softer and
more rugged terrain to approach an earth embankment and then came to rest
with both engines partially embedded in it. The ride across the overrun area
had been quite rough and much of the flight deck paperwork had become
dislodged, including the charts and checklists.
When the aircraft had stopped moving, the flight deck was in total
darkness. The commander and the first officer worked together to complete by
recall all the items of Emergency Evacuation checklist. TWR were informed at
00.51 hrs and the emergency services were requested. A confirmation was
given to the senior cabin crew member to initiate the evacuation.
The controller on duty noted that something was wrong and made four
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