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postdates the Boeing comment. If there were a disagreement here, I
would be interested in hearing this at future Task 6 report.
[COMMENT 3] The only OEM response received up to now shows
the item to be CLOSED and GREEN, yet the actual response itself
confirms there are no plans to specify different splicing practices to
accommodate adjacent materials or circuit loads. I note that Task
Group 6 have agreed to consider updating the splicing section of the
current advisory materials, with the revised material expected to be
provided to ATSRAC by July 2002. I propose that once this material
is available ATSRAC should reconsider the response(s) to
Recommendations 1.a.1 & 1.b.1, to determine whether we are
content that no action is to be taken.
OWNER REMARKS: OEM P2
As indicated in the Boeing reply, splices are specified in the wiring
design based upon the wire size, a direct result of the load on the
circuit. As the fire-retardancy properties of adjacent materials is not
normally known during the design or repair of the electrical system,
this recommendation is impractical. Typically the most restrictive
condition, such as the presence of fuel vapor, is used to assess the
splice type and installation technique, rather than assess the type and
proximity of all adjacent materials within a wiring run.
To address special conditions the use of only environmental splices is
one option, the replacement of non-fire retardant or flammable
materials another, and the proper use and installation of appropriate
splices to reduce the potential of high-resistance heating of the splice
a third. The OEMs will consider any forthcoming recommendations
regarding improvements in splicing practices to prevent the potential
for high resistance heating in the presence of flammable materials.
In addition, Airbus uses only environmental splices in production and
only environmental splices are allowed for repair.
1b1 WG/6OEM Consider updating splicing practice to reflect special consideration
associated with high-current carrying splices in bundles with wire
supporting multiple flight-critical systems
Boeing - Boeing has no plans to specify different splicing practices
to accommodate adjacent materials or circuit loads
8 April 19 2002 17
Airbus - Airbus will await any forthcoming revision to the splicing
section of the current AC as recommended by HWG6. Airbus
includes in the ESPM splicing practices. These rules take into
consideration the function ant use pertaining to that wire
Lockheed - LMCO has no plans to update splicing practices with
special consideration for high current splices. The SWPM provides
the correct method for making high current splices. Flight critical
systems are segregated from high current systems
[COMMENT] The only OEM response received up to now shows
the item to be CLOSED and GREEN, yet the actual response itself
confirms there are no plans to specify different splicing practices to
accommodate adjacent materials or circuit loads. I note that Task
Group 6 have agreed to consider updating the splicing section of the
current advisory materials, with the revised material expected to be
provided to ATSRAC by July 2002. I propose that once this material
is available ATSRAC should reconsider the response(s) to
Recommendations 1.a.1 & 1.b.1, to determine whether we are
content that no action is to be taken.
OWNER REMARKS: OEM P2
As indicated in the Boeing reply, splices are specified in production
based upon the wire size, a direct result of the load on the circuit.
The OEM ESWPM typically provides special procedures for routing
and splicing of power feeder cables. However, noting the expected
actions of HWG6, the OEMs will consider any forthcoming
recommendations regarding improvements in splicing practices
related to high-current applications adjacent to or within wire
bundles containing flight-critical systems.
In addition, Airbus uses only environmental splices in production and
only environmental splices are allowed for repair.
2c1 WG9/OEM Insure that drip guard installation and maintenance are appropriately
specified
WG9 - Installation of drip shields are an OEM design issue, and
existing Zonal Inspection requirements should be adequate to detect
malfunction, degradation, or failure of a drip shield. However, it is
possible that a drip shield could inadvertently be left off after
performing maintenance in a zone and the missing shield would not
necessarily be clearly evident. While this situation could exist on any
aircraft, HWG9 concludes that older aircraft that have undergone
repetitive heavy maintenance events are more likely to have
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