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wiring is presently taken into consideration during the design of the
electrical system. Allowable wire damage criteria is presently
specified in the SPWM. Boeing presently provides electrical load
documents with the delivery of new airplanes and conducts electrical
load analysis on in-service airplanes upon request
Airbus - Expected and actual sources of heat affecting electrical
wiring is presently taken into consideration during the design of the
electrical system. Allowable wire damage criteria is presently
specified in the ESPM. Airbus presently provides electrical load
documents (ELA) with the delivery of new airplanes. Airbus supplies
the ELA in an electronic format to allow the operator to update the
actual electrical load of the aircraft following post delivery
modification of the aircraft
Lockheed - LMCO design practices have taken into consideration
wiring in proximity to heat sources. Allowable damage to wire is
specified in the SWPM. LMCO provided operators with a load
analysis at delivery. It is the responsibility of the operator to update
the analysis as required
[COMMENT, also applies to 2.4/2.5 and 2c2] From the various
comments, I do not see an effort to include in the Task 6 report Part
25 Design guidelines that govern where heat shields/drip shields are
to be installed. While definition by each OEM as to where such
items are to be installed on a type certified airframe are provided
through the maintenance delivery documentation, there is nothing for
operators/STC agencies to use for after delivery changes to the
aircraft. Of concern are the various interior changes done by many
carriers that move galley and lavatories throughout the cabin. With
these interior changes, location of wiring, potable water, and waste
water lines are changing. I presently see no guidance coming that
instructs when to use heat shields/drip shields when an electrical
disconnect panel is now too close to the rerouted plumbing
components
OWNER REMARKS: WG6 P1
A new rule is drafted under sub-part 251705 to protect EWIS from
heat damage. Corresponding Advisory Materials is included in the
new wire AC/ACJ for EWIS
2a3 WG9 Investigate periodic, selective inspection and nondestructive testing
of cockpit and EE bay wiring. Accelerate removal of flammable
materials from the cockpit and electronics bay.
WG9 - EZAP requires full application of the logic in the cockpit and
electronics bay regardless of whether combustible materials are
PRIORITY
P1 ~ WG issue
P2 ~ OEM issue related to WG
P3 ~ OEM only, not related to WG
8 April 19 2002 3
likely to be present. Due to the congestion and difficult access to
these zones, it is expected that a Zonal Inspection will not be
assessed as adequate. The logic will identify dedicated visual
inspections, which could be Detailed Inspections in specific areas
that warrant closer attention. While "periodic" and "selective" visual
inspections will be identified, the use of non-destructive testing is
insufficiently mature to apply on a scheduled basis at this time.
Initially, new NDT methods would likely be used to support troubleshooting
activities that will provide the necessary experience to allow
assessment of their use in scheduled maintenance. To further mitigate
the concern for wiring in cockpit and electronics bay areas, EZAP
requires consideration of the presence of combustible materials in a
zone, and identification of tasks to remove significant accumulations
of combustible contamination. In addition, enhancements to
maintenance practices are proposed
That will minimize the risk of damage and contamination to wiring
caused by maintenance activity.
[COMMENT 1] My personal belief about combustible material is
that the EZAP logic should allow for their consideration without
requiring a definitive list of combustibles. Operators would be able
to implement the logic without any knowledge of the flammability
properties of the material in the zone. Operators who do not confirm
the absence of combustibles should assume the presence of
combustibles and inspect accordingly. If, however, the operator
could verify the absence of combustible materials in a zone, that
operator could take credit for this by performing a less intensive
inspection than would be required otherwise.
Furthermore, the classification of a zone as either containing
combustibles or not can be simplified without serious detriment to
safety. For example, the process could be as simple as this:
1) Consider all items in accessible zones (exclusive of the
cockpit) to be non-combustible.
2) For solid materials, if the type certificate is post 1972 then
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