曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
310 with P&W 4000 engines do not envision any periodic check or
adjustment of the effort required to move the throttle control lever.
This work is carried out irregularly at the request of flight crews
whenever they feel uncomfortable in controlling throttles. There was
no such record found in the log books of the accident airplane.
Analysis showed that, during operations, because of the loosening of
the friction unit the forces needed to move the throttle may be
reduced by a factor of 3 times as regards the regulation periodic
maintenance guides.
In operating the А-310 airplane with P&W 4000 engines, it is not
recommended to use the reverse thrust lever of an engine whose
thrust reverser has been deactivated. This fact rules out any uniform
procedure for controlling reverse in different circumstances (e.g. with
both thrust reversers working or with one deactivated thrust
reverser). There are no physical or electrical blockages against any
erroneous displacement in the direction of forward thrust of a throttle
control lever for an engine whose thrust reverser has been
deactivated.
Section TR 02-78 of the Master MEL and the corresponding section
of Sibir’s MEL, which defines the features of operating an airplane
with a deactivated thrust reverser, contain a warning that the pilot
flying the airplane must hold the thrust lever in the idle position
during a landing run to prevent any inadvertent movement of the
thrust lever in a forward thrust direction.
3.6. The crew had valid pilots’ licenses. The airplane captain’s flight
experience on the A-310 airplane amounted to 1056 hours, 1013 of
which were solo as an airplane captain (confirmed on 01 June 2005,
order no. 836). His experience as a trainee before being confirmed as
an airplane captain amounted to 43 hours over three weeks. He had
no previous experience as a co-pilot of an A-310.
The co-pilot’s total flight experience on the A-310 amounted to 158
hours, 92 of which were solo. He was appointed as a co-pilot on 05
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
111
May 2006, order no. 1218, and had been flying in this capacity for
about 2 months.
The conversion training and preparation of crew members were
carried out on the basis of the flight personnel training course
(ATC-А310) drawn up by Sibir and confirmed by the aviation
authorities of the Russian Federation.
During the investigation, the Commission detected a series of
deficiencies in the system for preparing and supporting the
professional standards of the flight crew at Sibir:
• The Sibir А-310 FPTP allowed those pilots to become airplane
captains who have solo experience on 1st class Russian airplane
but have not been trained as co-pilots and have no flight
operations experience on type as co-pilots. Some twenty A-310
airplane captains underwent such training, including the Captain.
Analysis showed that, of the 62 A-310 airplane captains who
worked for Sibir from mid-2004 to August 2006, only 20 pilots
completed the cycle of preparation including: co-pilot training,
commissioning as co-pilot, flight operations experience in this
position for up to one year, conversion training on the airplane
captains’ training course and commissioning as an airplane
captain. At the same time, the standard flight experience on Sibir
FPTP for those undergoing conversion training from the position
of airplane captain of Russian airplane was 30 flights; and for
those pilots who had no solo flying experience as an airplane
captain, it was 300 hours. This is 3-5 times less than what is
prescribed by the Aeroflot FPTP for the same type of airplane;
Note: There are no unified courses in the Russian Federation for flight
personnel advanced training that focus on learning the characteristics of crew
resource management (CRM) when undergoing conversion training from
Russian airplane with three or more crew members to airplane with a twoperson
flight crew.
• Sibir has not compiled a course for the initial training of
instructors. Staff instructors undergo appropriate training in
foreign training establishments in accordance with their own
courses.
• Despite the volume of objective information processing achieved
(90% of flights) within Sibir, the use of such information did not
fully comply with the requirements of the 1987 FOM. Analyses of
flights (for example, the overshooting of an A-310 at
Domodedovo airport on 29.06.05) were simply reduced to a
statement of fact, without any detailed analysis of the flight
parameters or the actions of the crew.
Final Report
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