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friction on the runway segment where the crew forcibly
(non-automatically) applied the brake (over the last
2000 m) corresponded to the standard values for a
runway "covered with water". It was impossible to
determine the condition of the initial third of the runway
(wet or covered with water) because of the use at this
stage of automatic brakes at LOW mode where an
airplane is slowed down at a given rate under any
condition of the runway. If the coefficient of friction
corresponded to a "wet" runway condition, the airplane
would have stopped within the limit of the runway, even
given the actual forward thrust of the left engine, which
was caused by the significantly larger magnitude (about
3 times) of the friction coefficient for the "wet" runway
condition compared to a runway "covered with water"
at speeds of about 150-180 kph, at which the forcible
braking of the airplane was initiated on its landing run
on the accident flight. Thus, the actual state of the
runway was one of the factors that influenced the
deceleration rate and speed value at the runway
excursion moment.
The existing procedure for estimating the state of the runway does not
make it possible to accurately determine the braking conditions for water
covered runways at speeds that are significantly greater than the
measurements taken.
At 22:44:05 after the left TCL reached the 22º position TLA, the
emergency signal for wrong take-off configuration was initiated, accompanied
by the CRC audible warning and the MASTER WARNING light.
In accordance with the logic of the flight warning computer (FWC), the
functioning of this signal should be blocked during the run after landing (stage
10). However, on this flight, because of the retraction of the thrust reverser, the
location of the airplane on the ground at a speed of more than 70 knots and the
position of the TCL of the left engine at more than 22 degrees TLA, the FWC
shifted over normally to stage 4 (take-off) and issued a warning to the left
ECAM display about the non-takeoff position of the flaps, slats and stabilizers,
as well as the automatic copy of the ENG page on the right ECAM display.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
103
In general, SOP and FCOM А-310 prescribe that, when the ECAM signal
is initiated, the piloting crew member should give the command to the nonpiloting
member to take the necessary action and follow what is on the ECAM
display (ECAM actions). The pilot not flying determines the type of signal,
reads the messages on the screen and confirms whether the failure is actual or
not. According to data from the recorded conversations in the cockpit, the
captain of the airplane and the co-pilot did not audibly refer to any such actions
when the emergency signal was activated. The average time needed to read out
the text information that appeared on the ECAM display in this instance ("Flaps
not in t.o. config, slats not in t.o. config, pitch trim not in t.o. range") is 7-8
seconds (according to results of tests with A-310 pilots at different stages of
training).
In the case in question, the ECAM did not offer the crew any concrete
actions in respect of their intention to perform a full landing. In fact, because of
the crew’s actions in moving one TCL to a position greater than 22°TLA, the
ECAM indications referred to a non-take off configuration. On the other hand,
one of the necessary conditions for the functioning of this signal is the position
of the TCL of any engine at a position higher than 22 degrees TLA, which could
have served as a clue to the crew.
Note: FCOM А-310 1.9.50 contains the information that this
warning appears if at least one engine has take off power
without specifying the exact numerical criteria for take off
power mode.
SOP’s and the А-310 FCOM do not specify any crew actions
when this type of signal is actuated during a landing run.
While this emergency signal was sounding and continued to function until
the end of the recording, the co-pilot reported completion of landing at the third
attempt to the controller13. It should be noted that the SOP of Russian airlines
during domestic flights provide for a "landing" report to the controller after
deceleration to taxi speed. In this case the airplane's speed was well above taxi
speed and the co-pilot's report could have hampered his performance to the
detriment of the monitoring of instruments and landing-run parameters during a
period of high workload, because of the necessity to determine the reason for the
emergency warning being given.
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