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types of airplane without undergoing the co-pilot training course and without
flight operations experience as a co-pilot. In particular, the Captain (captain of
the А-310 F-OGYP airplane that was involved in the accident at Irkutsk airport
on July 9, 2006) was authorized to fly as the airplane captain of the А-310 after
flying 43 hours as a trainee on this type of airplane, without having to go
through the commissioning course as a co-pilot, though having the
corresponding flight operations experience in this position. Another 18 pilots
went through a similar simplified procedure for commissioning as airplane
captain of the A-310.
So, out of 62 captains (working at Sibir from the middle of 2004 to
August 2006) only 20 went through the cycle including: A-310 co-pilot training,
commissioning as a co-pilot, flight operations experience in this position for up
to one year, conversion training on the airplane captains’ training course and
commissioning as a A-310 airplane captain.
Another example of the peculiarities of flight crew training at Sibir is
highlighted by comparing the volume of operational flights of co-pilots at this
airline with those at Aeroflot. At Sibir, for example, an airplane captain of a
Russian-made airplane who went through conversion training on the co-pilot
training course had to carry out no less than 30 flights (up to 150 hours) as copilot
under operational conditions until commissioned as an A-310 airplane
captain, while pilots who did not have solo flight experience as airplane captains
of a Russian-made airplane had to complete 300 hours. According to the A-310
FPTP at Aeroflot, these figures are, respectively, 500 and 1500 hours, that is, 3
to5 times more.
These circumstances in particular explain the unusually high rate of
conversion training of flight crews on the A-310 airplane at Sibir, reaching a
level of 6 pilots per month, given the actual number (8 persons) of authorized
instructors ensuring the conversion training of pilots in simulators at foreign
centers (Toulouse, Paris and Frankfurt).
The instructors underwent the corresponding conversion training at
foreign training centers on the training courses at these centers. The initial
training course for instructors at Sibir was not written .
At the time of writing (August 2006) there were 47 airplane captains and
49 co-pilots working at Sibir who were authorized to fly the A-310 airplane.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
65
As the analysis showed, this resulted from the need to cater to the
intense growth of traffic at Sibir.
There were other shortcomings in the organization of flight duties. In
spite of the volume of processed objective information (90% of flights
performed) the heavy workload of the command and instructor team caused by
the commissioning of crews gave rise to a perfunctory approach in the use of
this information in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the 1987 Civil
Aviation Flight Organization Manual (CAFOM 87).
Post-flight debriefings in flight squadrons were held once a month.
The debriefing plan was drawn up in accordance with the requirements
of category 9.2, item 9.2.7 of CAFOM 87. One should note the formal content
of the initial section of the debriefing (ensure execution, take measures, etc.)
which was not derived from the general and methodological part of the
debriefing.
Debriefings of incidents (for example, the A-310 incident on June 29,
2005 at Domodedovo airport), according to available records, were simply
reduced to the statement of facts without any detailed analysis of flight
parameters and crew actions. The incident to the A-310 airplane was not
mentioned in post-flight debriefings. Insufficient attention was given in postflight
debriefings to the analysis of materials from flight data recorders in spite
of the fact that this was occasionally recorded in the methodological section of
the debriefing.
If deviations in the execution of flights are discovered, all the more so if
incidents occur, the airplane captain and the co-pilot ought to be given the
opportunity to come forward with an analysis of flight parameters (based on
readouts of recorded results) and of their own actions, and the instructor or
commander to state the reasons for these deviations.
The practice of collecting signatures of the flight crew signaling their
familiarity with the results of the debriefing, including any entries containing no
useful information for them, attests to the perfunctory attitude towards postflight
debriefings (the most important remedial measure ensuring flight safety).
It should be noted that FTOA does not send airlines investigation
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