曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
accident. These included:
• MES: 18 fire vehicles and 80 rescuers, 14 fire tank trucks and 8 pieces of
special-purpose equipment;
• Accident-related medical assistance: 2 vehicles and 6 doctors;
• First aid: 8 vehicles.
The fire on the airplane was extinguished at 1:05 on July 9, 2006.
In summary:
1. Members of the cabin crew (flight attendants) were located inside the
airplane according to the Emergency schedule of actions of crew during airplane
take-off and landing.
At the time of the airplane's collision all members of the cabin crew were
in their seats with their seat belts fastened.
Members of the cabin crew who were inside the airplane cabins in a state
of work preparedness ensured the commencement of evacuation of passengers
right after the airplane collided with the barriers.
The actions of the able-bodied members of the cabin crew who were
inside the airplane cabins allowed the evacuation of 67 people from the burning
airplane within the shortest time in the fast-moving and extreme situation that
arose.
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
54
2. The actions of the fire and rescue details of the departmental fire brigade of
the flight search and rescue service, freelance crash and rescue teams, their
personnel, the supply and quantity of fire-extinguishing agents, the time of
deployment at the time of eliminating the consequences of the accident met
the requirements of the 1992 Guideline for the Civil Aviation Flight Search
and Rescue Service (GFSRS CA-92) and ensured that 11 more people were
rescued despite the rapidly developing situation.
3. The total number of individuals evacuated from the burning airplane was 78
(75 passengers) out of the 203 individuals on board.
1.16. Tests and Research
1.16.1. Full-scale experiment
During the course of the investigation Airbus specialists performed a fullscale
experiment (run-throughs on the paved runway) to determine the
longitudinal deceleration load under which the accidental forward movement of
the throttle control lever was possible, thereby increasing forward thrust. The
experiments were performed on an aircraft with P&W 4000 engines with its
friction units removed. The force needed to propel one throttle control lever was
less than 400 grams. The run-throughs were performed on runways at the Airbus
base in Toulouse.
The results of the experiment show that the magnitude of longitudinal
deceleration load whereby the accidental forward movement of the throttle
control lever commences is of approximately 0.25 g. If the rate of deceleration
was maintained, the throttle control lever would continue to move at a
continuous speed, non-stop. These results and a comparison of recordings of the
longitudinal load and positions of the throttle control lever of the left engine
during the accidental flight allow us to conclude that, even during the complete
breakdown of the friction unit that provides additional forces in the control
linkage, the accidental movement of the throttle control lever was impossible in
practice.
1.16.2. Mathematical simulation
A mathematical simulation was carried out in order to analyze the correct
functioning of the aircraft and engine systems, to determine the actual
deceleration conditions on the runway, and to assess the effect of any external
distortions and possible scenarios of the development of events.
As a result of a reconstruction of the accident flight, it was established
that the thrust of both engines, as recorded by the FDR as the airplane was on its
landing run along the runway, corresponds to that calculated for the recorded
position of the throttle control lever/reverse thrust lever and the actual
conditions at Irkutsk airport.
Seven seconds after the main landing gear touched the runway, the LOW
braking mode automatically switched on. This facilitated the preset deceleration
Final Report
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVIATION COMMITTEE
55
gradient of 1.7 m/s*s until the crew applied the brakes to manually slow down
the wheels.
The actual coefficient of friction (deceleration) on the runway segment
where the crew forcibly (non-automatically) applied the brake (~2000 m)
corresponded to standard values for a runway "covered with water". It was
impossible to determine the condition of the initial segment of the runway
because of the use at this stage of automatic brakes in LOW mode where an
airplane is slowed down at a given rate under any runway condition (“wet” or
“covered with water”).
Aside from the reconstruction of the accident flight, the following
scenarios were also simulated (elements whose effect was assessed in every
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