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difficulty of interfacing the human crew with what was then just the auto pilot. As a systems
designer of sorts myself, this was not news to me.
The technical problems are these: Pilots’ decisions regarding aircraft control are,
amongst other things, based on instrument readings, control responses and control tower
instructions. In the normal course of flying a plane, these details are acquired as you go
along. If, on the other hand, you have to hand over control from machine to human, all
this has to be done over a short period if not instantly. If this happens at a time of stress,
mistakes are even more likely than if it happens in the normal course of events.
Once upon a time, pilots flew planes by the use of hands and feet on column and
pedals. With to-day’s 200 ton monsters, control surfaces are difficult to operate this way.
Also, steel cables and hydraulic lines are heavy, and have to be duplicated or triplicated
for safety. All that lifting capacity can be diverted to lifting passengers and cargo by
operating controls and surfaces independently. The Airbus series of planes is therefore
flown, as they say, by wire, using electrics or hydraulics. The human pilot’s commands
are fed into the computer and the computer passes these commands on to the plane’s
control surfaces, if it wants to, after subjecting the computer’s decision to the scrutiny of
sundry mathematical processes. As a sop to the human pilot some pressures are simulated
on pedals and stick to make the slave at the controls feel that he or she is in charge.
Boeings are similar, but there at least the option exists for the pilot to exercise the ultimate
control should the computers fail. No such options exist for the Airbus. The electronics
can over-ride the human pilot.
Spare a thought or two for him or her. World-wide, pilots would know what happened
in Western Australia where they had to wrestle with the Airbus controls while passengers
had their bones broken, and where a major disaster was avoided by a whisker. So far,
the only steps taken to avoid disasters like the Mexican is to duplicate, triplicate or quadruplicate
the faulty system.
Every pilot, no matter how experienced, currently flying an Airbus relying on ADIRU
– as most of them appear to be – would have to remember that they are at the mercy of a
machine which has proved faulty and undoubtedly will prove so again It may well result in
a situation which is beyond any pilot’s control. And since Abeles’ victory, aircraft captains
cannot even refuse to fly the faulty planes. All this would do wonders for morale.
There used to be a saying at Telstra that nowadays telephone exchanges were
staffed by a man and a dog. The man is there to feed the dog and the dog is trained to
stop the man from getting to the equipment. This fly-by-wire seems to follow a similar
philosophy. Because the flight computers are programmed with the parameters which
represent the limits of what the plane can do, they are made the masters of the human
pilot.
I remember a paper by an Indian academic which argued that in order to create safe
systems they had to have a maximum of sophisticated technology backed up by the best
available staff training. This is a nonsense. Good staff training can only be achieved by
allowing staff maximum interaction to permit familiarity with the system. This was amply
proved in disasters like Three Mile Island nuclear power station where human operators
were given a few seconds to deal with a mass of complex problems after the automatic
controls gave up. So did the operators.
Step aside, Sully Sullenberger, we can no longer afford the likes of you at the aircraft’s
controls.
Interim Report
Ministère de l’écologie, de l’énergie, du Développement durable et de l’Aménagement du territoire
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses
pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile
Accident on 27 November 2008
off the coast of Canet-Plage (66)
to the Airbus A320-232
registered D-AXLA
operated by XL Airways Germany
N° ISBN : 978-2-11-098614-6
- 2 -
F O R E W O R D
This interim report presents the circumstances and facts established at this point in the
investigation. Any interpretation or extrapolation of these elements would be mere
speculation at the present time.
In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, with EC
directive 94/56 and with the French Civil Aviation Code (Book VII), the investigation is
intended neither to apportion blame, nor to assess individual or collective responsibility. The
sole objective is to draw lessons from this occurrence which may help to prevent future
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