There has been a marked increase in missile attacks since 1984. On 21 September 1984 Afghan counter-revolutionaries .red a surface-to-air missile and hit a DC-10 Ariana Airliner carrying 308 passengers. The explosion tore through the aircraft’s left engine, damaging its hydraulic system and a wing containing a fuel tank. The captain of the aircraft, however, managed to land the aircraft safely at Kabul International Airport.64
Another signi.cant incident took place on 4 April 1985, when a member of Abu Nidal group .red an RPG rocket at an Alia airliner as it took off from Athens Airport. Although the rocket did not explode, it left a hole in the fuselage.65
Advanced missiles and rockets can be found in many terrorist and insurgent armouries. It is suspected that some terrorist organizations, including Iranian militia in Lebanon, the Provisional Irish Republican Army and various African and Latin American insurgents, possess the sophisticated Russian-made RPG-7 portable rocket launcher, but it is disturbing to note that some terrorist organizations, most notably Palestinian groups, have their own RPG-7-manufacturing facilities. In addition, more than a dozen other terrorist and insurgent groups are known to possess portable surface-to-air missiles, These groups include various Cuban surrogates, Colombian drug dealers, and a number of African, European and Palestinian terrorist organizations.66
The possibility of undeterred use of missiles may be encouraged by the rapid proliferation of such weaponry and the publicity to be gained by using such systems. The enhanced effectiveness of missiles against aircraft makes the threat of such attacks real.
63Mickolus (1980, p. 581); Al-Hadaf, Al-Hadaf mao AlBabtal al-Muharrarin: Al-Muo taqilun
hawwalu Dhallam al-Asr ila Nidhal Mushriq (Al-Hadaf with the Liberated Heroes: The detainees
Transformed the Gloom of Imprisonment Into a Shining Struggle), June 1985, pp. 35–41;
Associated Press, 15 August 1979.
64U.S. Department of Transportation (FAA), Worldwide Signi.cant Acts Involving Civil Aviation,
1984, p. 14.
65U.S. Department of Defence, Terrorist Group Pro.les (Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 1989), p. 7.
66Adams (1990,
pp.
60–61);
Wilkinson
(1986, pp. 39–40); Dobson and Payne (1982, p. 119).
XI. Installation of an Anti-missile System
The installation of a sophisticated antimissile system similar to that employed on military aircraft to divert surface-to-air missiles is an effective deterrent. One good example is the measure taken by the British government which, immediately after the discovery of 20 SA-7s in the coaster Eksund, which was intercepted by French authorities off the coast of Brittany in November 1987 when bound for the IRA, .tted all British Army helicopters .ying in Northern Ireland with electronic and other decoy systems to confuse the missile’s heat-seeking guidance system. These included the US-made Saunders, AN/ALG 144. This system, when linked to the Tracor AN/ALE 40 chaff dispenser, works by jamming the missile’s homing radar and sending infra-red .ares and chaff to act as a decoy for the heat-seeking device.67
The system is used by both the US and the Israeli Armies, which have been well-pleased with its performance. Until the British realised that the IRA might be in possession of SAMs, the Ministry of Defense hesitated to install such a system because of the high cost involved, and its decision to do so shows the seriousness of the threat. Another example of a good counter-measure is the response of El Al airlines to the threat of such an attack which included the installation of electronic countermeasure equipment similar to that employed on military aircraft to divert surface-to-air missiles.68
However the problem is that these countermeasures are not yet fully effective, although they could minimize the threat. Hence there is a need to proceed diligently with the development of systems that are guaranteed to be able to prevent this type of attack against civil aviation.
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