曝光台 注意防骗
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Comprehensive statistical analysis of audit results and levels of compliance (globally, by region, and by subject matter) is available on the USAP secure website. Key .ndings are presented at both the national and airport levels. Accord-ing to the progress report submitted to the ICAO Council in 2006 the ICAO Secretariat advised that in the case of States that are demonstrating little or no progress by the time of the follow-up visit, a cross analysis of the USAP audit results with those of the USOAP reveals that generally, States that have dif.culty in implementing the safety-related SARPs are also experiencing dif.culties with the implementation of the Annex provisions on the security side. Certain contributing factors have been identi.ed. These often include a lack of .nancial and/or suitably quali.ed human resources as well as frequent changes in key personnel within a State’s Appropriate Authority. In certain cases, there also appears to be a certain complacency and general lack of interest in implementing the ICAO recommendations.
In order to address the issue of States that are not responding effectively to the ICAO audit process, a high-level Secretariat Audit Results Review Board has recently been established for the purpose of examining both the safety and security histories of speci.c States brought to its attention by either ICAO’s USOAP or USAP. The objective would be is to highlight or raise the pro.le of these States within the system in order to encourage them to take responsible actions in a measured and timely manner.
The Committee on Unlawful Interference of the ICAO Council has recom-mended to the Council that these data and trends be made public at the Assembly. Although such information has been restricted in the past, the Committee believes all States and the public should be aware of the areas needing improvement without identifying speci.c States or vulnerabilities. Further, the Council has been discuss-ing with the Secretariat ways in which it can most effectively exercise its oversight responsibilities with respect to States that do not comply with their responsibilities under the Convention and its Annexes.
While reports show that many ICAO Member States have actively used infor-mation gathered from USAP audits to improve their security systems, reports also demonstrate that other States cannot or will not make necessary changes. For those States that lack resources to improve their security systems, new mechanisms such as ICAO’s Coordinated Assistance and Development (CAD) Programme are in place to assist in directing longer-term attention to problems. For those States that remain unable to improve their security systems, bringing such challenges before the Audit Results Review Board, and possibly the Council, for consideration are valuable steps toward addressing the de.ciencies in the longer term. However, the vulnerabilities presented by unresolved and sustained issues represents a signi.cant weakness in the global protective network and a possible critical or urgent area of vulnerability for other Member States with air carrier service at the airport of interest, particularly when combined with indications of a heightened threat.
In building a security culture within ICAO member States it is imperative that Consideration should also be given to the development of a process for ensuring that all Member States are noti.ed when de.ciencies identi.ed during the course of a USAP audit remain unaddressed for a sustained period of time. A noti.cation process could involve the use of information which does not divulge speci.c vulnerabilities but enables States to initiate consultations with the State of interest to ensure the continued protection of aviation assets on a bilateral basis. Such a noti.cation process may result in a strengthened ability on the part of ICAO to ensure that States unwilling to meet basic security standards will be held account-able and allow for a limited amount of transparency in the security audit programme without divulging speci.c potential security vulnerabilities.
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Aviation Security Law 航空安全法(195)
