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时间:2010-08-15 08:53来源:蓝天飞行翻译 作者:admin
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· Provision of detailed documentation (hardware and procedures)
· Provision of description, hazard analysis
· Six weeks prior to flight:
· Security review
· One week prior to flight:
· Hardware reception at Bordeaux
· Hardware mounting and assembly
· Experimental ground testing
· One week to one day prior to flight:
· Loading, bolting, and electrical connecting
· One day prior to flight:
· Security visit
· FLIGHT DAY(S)
· Last flight day (afternoon) - unloading
Flight Campaign Organization Chapter 6
Edition 5.2 6.6
6.13 Test Personnel Timeline
· Five years to three weeks prior to flight:
· Hypobaric chamber test training
· One year to three weeks prior to flight:
· Medical aptitude exam
· One month prior to flight:
· Detailed information on each person flying
· One week prior to flight:
· Parental authorization for personnel (if applicable)
· Waiver of liability signed by company and personnel
· One day prior to flight :
· Pre-flight briefing
· FLIGHT DAY(S)
Novespace will deliver, one month prior to flight, a precise schedule for the week before and the
week of flights.
Edition 5.2 A1.1
Hazard Analysis Appendix 1
The following hazard analysis guidelines were adapted from NASA Hazard Analysis
Guidelines. These guidelines are intended to help the test developer to perform the
hazard analysis, to identify hazards in the test equipment and procedures, and to
prepare the hazard analysis required for the test equipment data package (see Section
4.2 of this document).
A. Experiment Hazard Evaluation
This portion of the data package should contain a brief summary of the results of an
intensive review of the experiment hardware and planned test operations. These data
should identify potential hazard sources inherent in either the experiment equipment or
test operations. In attempting to identify these hazards, the evaluator should keep in
mind "Murphy’s Law" which states, "If anything can go wrong, it most likely will."
During the evaluation process, the evaluator should take a devil’s advocate position
while reviewing the experiment design, performance configuration, and planned
operations. All hazards which could cause injury to flight test personnel or adversely
affect the flight worthiness of the A300 Zero-G aircraft should be carefully assessed in
this process, no matter how far away the possibility of such an occurrence may seem to
be. To aid in this process, a Hazard Source Checklist has been included in the
following sections.
The evaluator should note that no potential hazard should be ignored and left
unidentified just because stringent precautions have been taken to prevent the hazard
from occurring.
Hazard Analysis Appendix 1
Edition 5.2 A1.2
Such precautions are called Hazard Controls. The proper approach to such a
situation is to identify both the hazard and the controls utilized to prevent its
occurrence. Another common error in hazard identification frequently occurs when the
evaluator determines that a condition or situation normally considered a hazard should
not be included in the hazard evaluation because it is not considered to be a credible
hazard. An example illustrating this point is the use of a very small amount of a toxic
substance in an experiment such as mercury which, for photographic purposes, must be
placed in a glass container. Because the quantity of mercury used is so small, the
evaluator reasons that, even if the glass container breaks, there is no need to identify the
mercury as a hazard source. This is not correct! The proper approach is to place the
mercury on the hazard list and then demonstrate, by analytical means, that if all the
available mercury were dispersed in the immediate environment, the maximum
concentration possible would still be within acceptable industrial hygiene limits. Only
after such an evaluation can the mercury be considered to constitute a non-credible
hazard.
In summation, the evaluator should identify those hazard sources which are considered
most critical from a safety standpoint and those which require special or unique
controls to ensure that a hazardous condition or accident will not occur. If the
evaluation indicates that no significant hazards exist in the experiment or in planned
experiment operations, the evaluator should clarify this, as well.
Hazard Analysis Appendix 1
Edition 5.2 A1.3
B. Hazard List
Based on the evaluation discussed in Section A, the experimenter shall prepare a
 
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