曝光台 注意防骗
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issue a safety recommendation related to this fact.
2.7. Suitability of the operational procedures
The Operations Manual of the operator did not have any procedure to be applied in the
event that residual pressure was detected in flight. Neither did have the Standard Operational
Procedures (SOP) of the manufacturer.
When faced with this situation, a flight crew had the following options:
— To take no action, with the understanding that if the Operations Manual does not
say anything, there is no need to do anything, and to land in a normal way, with
antiskid connected and without delaying the application of brakes. If this had been
the course of action taken in the landing in Barajas, the result would have been that
at touch down (should the autobrake have been connected) or at application of left
brake, the residual pressure would have been released and the braking action would
have been normal.
— To seek technical support on the effects of the indication of residual pressure and the
actions to be taken. This support could have been sought after landing in Tenerife
but in flight, during the approach to Barajas and after having lowered the landing
gear, it was much more complicated, because a go around would have been to be
carried out to try then to communicate with the ground personnel of the operator.
— To make on board the decision to initiate some action to mitigate the possible
effects of that indication based in previous experience. This was the option taken by
Technical report IN-062/2002
50
the crew in this case, using the negative experience they had in the landing in Tenerife
in the same conditions of residual pressure, and therefore they decided to disconnect
the antiskid and to delay the application of brakes as much as possible
during the landing.
After the incident, the manufacturer issued a telex to the operators (see paragraph 1.18)
and modified their SOP to clarify the actions to be taken by the crew under that situation.
Among those actions is to leave the antiskid connected during the landing and to
press the pedals in flight to release the residual pressure.
It is considered those actions are convenient to prevent similar events, because the previous
SOP did not adequately cover that contingency, since an indication was described
(amber bars in the page WHEEL of the ECAM) without clarifying whether it was displayed
in flight, on ground or in both cases, and without providing instructions to be
followed in that event.
In this case, a crew faced with that situation in flight, with no information on previous
similar cases and without having seen it during training, as it was this case according
to the information gathered, could be unsure whether the lack of procedure was due
to an omission of the manual more than to the intend of the designers that no action
was needed. A more comprehensive knowledge of the brake system would have helped
the crew to make the right decision. Even though the reaction of other crews of
the same operator that faced residual pressure indications in flight was not the same
and those flights ended with no consequences, it is considered that a more detailed
study of the brake system of the A-340 during training for initial type rating would be
recommendable. The manufacturer stated that their recommended syllabus was enough
for the crews to understand the brake system of the A-340. The operator devoted 6 h
on the ground to study the electrical, hydraulic, landing gear and APU systems. Additionally,
there was a four-hour session of flight simulator to cover ECAM and failures
associated to electrical and hydraulic systems.
On the other hand, several discrepancies have been observed between the Operations
Manual of the operator and the SOP of the manufacturer:
— The manufacturer specifically recommends using the autobrake except on very long
runways where it is expected that braking will not be necessary, whereas the operator
says that in a dry runway of normal length, normally the use of autobrake is
not necessary.
— The operator requires to make a reset of the BSCU if the message «Brakes residual
braking» appears on ground, while the manufacturer requires that Maintenance is
advised in that case with no further action taken by the crew in the corresponding
procedure of the SOP, although they allow the reset in the Chapter «Supplementary
techniques». The text of the FOT of Airbus on the matter also mentions the possibility
that the crew make a reset.
51
Technical report IN-062/2002
Information retrieved from several sources indicates that there was a culture among
operators that the use of the autobrake appreciably increased the worn of the brakes
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