曝光台 注意防骗
网曝天猫店富美金盛家居专营店坑蒙拐骗欺诈消费者
and therefore the task ends. They added, late in the investigation process (see above),
that even though this fault confirmation failed because they checked the pressure in left
leg on 11 June 2002, they still applied the operational test 32-43-00-710-801 to be sure
that the system was OK.
1.7. Meteorological information
The METAR at Madrid-Barajas Airport on 7-9-2002 at 13:00 UTC was:
LEMD 071300Z 23011 KT 180V250 9999 FEW080 SCT150 27/07 Q1016 NOSIG
The information gathered shows that the temperature of the atmosphere in the province
of Madrid at 13000 ft of altitude approximately matched that of the International
Standard Atmosphere (ISA).
1.8. Aids to navigation
They do not affect the circumstances of this incident.
Technical report IN-062/2002
24
1.9. Communications
The communications worked normally all the time during the incident. The relevant
communications of the conversations with the control towers of Tenerife Norte and
Madrid-Barajas has been reproduced in other parts of this report.
1.10. Aerodrome information
1.10.1. Airport of Tenerife Norte
This airport has an asphalt runway, 12-30 of 3400 × 45 m. The runway stripe has
3520 × 300 m.
The aerodrome category for rescue and fire fighting is 8 (aircraft of less than 61 m of
total length and 7 m of maximum fuselage width).
1.10.2. Airport of Madrid-Barajas
The airport has three asphalt runways: 33-15 (4100 × 60 m), 36R-18L (3700 × 45 m)
and 36L-18R (4350 × 60 m). The runway stripe has a width of 300 m in all of them.
The aerodrome category for rescue and fire fighting is 9 (aircraft of less than 76 m of
total length and 7 m of maximum fuselage width).
The day of the incident runway 33 was being used for landings and runway 36L for
takeoffs. As a consequence of the incident, when runway 33 remained out of service,
runway 36R was open for landings.
1.11. Flight recorders
1.11.1. Cockpit voice recorder
The aircraft had a solid state cockpit voice recorder (SSCVR) Honeywell P/N 980-6022-
001; S/N 6393705700, that is able to record the latest 120 minutes of the voices and
sounds in the cockpit in four channels. Channel 1 records the sound of the headphones
and boom microphone in the pilot in command position; channel 2 records the
sound of the headphones and boom microphone of the copilot position; channel 3 the
sound of the headphones and boom microphone of the flight observer position; and
channel 4 the cockpit environment sounds through the area microphone.
25
Technical report IN-062/2002
The recorder starts recording since the moment the first engine is started, and keeps
continuously recording the sound of the four channels until five minutes after the last
engine has been shut down. It can also operate in manual mode on ground.
The files corresponding to the 4 channels were downloaded and the sound could be
reproduced with a good quality and made it possible to identify the text of almost all
the conversations between the pilots and communications with the ATC.
Each channel had 2 h, 1 minute and 10 s of sound. Part of the flight from Tenerife Norte
to Madrid had been recorded, exactly 1:21:29 (81 minutes and 29 seconds) elapsed
before the aircraft stopped on runway 33 of Barajas, and then continued recording for
11 minutes and 54 seconds until the recording stopped because the engines were shut
down. Then, a new recording period started with duration of 28 min and 5 s in which
it could be heard the voices of maintenance personnel working inside the cockpit after
the incident.
Therefore, the moments previous and later the incident itself were recorded and the
pertinent information provided by the conversations and other sounds has been used in
several parts of this report.
1.11.2. Flight data recorder
The aircraft was equipped by a digital flight data recorder (DFDR) able to record the
latest 25 h of a total of 663 parameters of the aircraft. The reading of this DFDR was
carried out without problems in a laboratory with capacity for it and the relevant information
provided by the different parameters has been reproduced in several parts of
this report.
The DFDR also showed the following actions of the flight crew:
— During the cruise flight to Madrid the pages of ECAM were not deployed to check
the status of the different systems.
— The spoilers were not armed during the landing in Madrid.
1.12. Wreckage and impact information
The aircraft came to a stop besides the left side of runway 33, with its longitudinal axis
rotated around 10° with respect to the runway axis and with all its wheels on the
asphalt area.
Technical report IN-062/2002
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