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The captain and PF answered: «For the moment no», and added two seconds later:
«Yes, it deviates, yes» and then «It departs a little bit». Seven seconds later the captain
told the copilot to apply pedal and then to brake with the right brake. The copilot answered
he was already braking.
43
Technical report IN-062/2002
At 13:03:45 h the right pedal was fully pressed, making the pressure of the alternate
system of that side to increase up to 2500 psi, and the pressure of the left side to
decrease down to 600 psi from the initial 800 psi of trapped pressure built-up during
the flight.
The left pedal was not pressed any time and the aircraft finally came to a stop with all
the wheels burst.
According to some braking marks noted in runway 33 after the incident, the first point
where tracks of the bust left wheels are clearly noticed is 630 m rearwards the point of
final stop of the aircraft (i.e. approximately 900 m away from the threshold of runway
33). This would indicate that initially the aircraft touched down (at 240 m from the
threshold) and the residual pressure of 800 psi that was amassed in flight started actuating
in the left side. To avoid the deviation the PF applied more and more right rudder,
in a scenario similar to that faced in Tenerife, although now the pressure was 800 psi
instead of 900 psi in Tenerife. At a given moment, the left wheels burst because they
had touched down already locked, and from that point in which the aircraft had approximately
100 kt of speed, the directional control was much lesser because of the combination
of decrease of effectiveness of the rudder with the burst of the tires, that
initially decreased the braking force on that side.
The aircraft deviated in that area to the right of the runway axis to move then clearly
to the left starting approximately at 100 m before the intersection with runway 36R.
This fact could be due to the continuous decrease of the effect of the rudder and the
loss of part of the left tires and dragging of the rims and brakes assembly along the
runway surface.
The PF decided to apply right brake and 40 m after crossing runway 36R the right
pedal started to be pressed until it reached its stop when the aircraft was 73 m
beyond the intersection of both runways. In this point, tracks of the right wheels were
first noticed in the runway. These tracks showed a heavy braking action until the right
tires burst because a high pressure up to 2500 psi was applied. That braking action in
the right side prevented the nose of the aircraft moving further to the left of the runway
axis and from that point on the aircraft had a straight trajectory towards the runway
left edge.
The left wheels crossed the runway side stripe marking in a point located 120 m before
the final position of the aircraft, while the right wheel came to a stop just above that
marking (see the white line of Figure 6).
Finally, the braking action (although reduced because of the burst of all the wheels) and
that of the thrust reverses that were deployed after touchdown, allowed the aircraft to
be stopped inside the asphalted zone, although with the left wheels beyond the runway
edge lighting line.
Technical report IN-062/2002
44
2.4. Actions after the aircraft came to a stop
The information gathered indicate that although the fire fighters were not previously
warned, at 13:09:55 h, that is, after 3 min and 55 s the tower activated the alarm, they
had extinguished the fire of the wheels and had the situation under control. It took
some time to the flight crew to receive information from outside the cockpit regarding
the status of the aircraft.
The aircraft stopped at 13:05 h and at 13:05:41 h another aircraft informed by radio
that the wheels were on fire.
Initially, the flight crew were evaluating the need to shut down the engines, advise the
cabin crew to be prepared or to order an evacuation. In the mean time, they called their
company to request assistance. They were seeing fire fighters around the aircraft, but
did not have clues of fire or smoke. At 13:08:24 h they addressed the passengers and
the cabin crew members to advise them to remain seated without using the mobile telephones.
Therefore, there was a period of 3 min and 24 s since the aircraft was stopped until the
passengers were addressed. During that period, the crew had some workload to communicate
with the tower, to check the status of the systems of the aircraft, to evaluate
the available information that was incomplete at the first moments, and to think of
the options to be followed before informing the passengers.
The data retrieved in the investigation show that the air traffic control and airport services
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