7.3.2 Backing Evidence from Field Service Experience
Arguments and evidence should be available that show:
i) The proposed software and the software for which the field service experience is available are identical or sufficiently similar.
ii) The proposed operational environment and the operational environment for which the field service experience is available are identical or sufficiently similar.
iii) The proposed hardware and the hardware for which the field service experience is available are identical or sufficiently similar.
iv) All attributes of the software safety requirements being justified from field experience have been exercised in the deployed software.
v) A Defect Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (DRACAS) is in place for the deployed software, and is operated in a reliable manner, adequate to support the claims made for the software.
vi) The field service records are correct and complete.
vii)Procedures and tools were used to support the analysis of field service experience, to ensure that analysis has been carried out as required in the analysis procedure, and that the results satisfy the analysis criteria.
viii)The procedures and tools used to support the analysis of field service experience were verified and validated.
ix) Any tools used to support analysis maintain the integrity of the results and the operational software.
x) Sufficient experience exists to demonstrate that the acceptance criteria for each attribute of the software safety requirement have been met.
xi) For all reported failures of an attribute in the software architectural unit, the underlying fault has been corrected, or that the fault is not relevant because it has no safety impact.
xii)All field reports identifying failures of the attributes, of the software safety requirements being justified from field experience have been made available.
7.3.3 Backing Evidence from Design Analysis
Arguments and evidence should be available which show that:
i) The design notations are capable of supporting the identification of all attributes that are to be analysed.
ii) The analytic methods and techniques used are appropriate for the attributes of the software safety requirement.
iii) The analysis notations are appropriate to the problem domain and representation and allow an adequate analysis of the design.
iv) The analysis techniques have been applied by adequately qualified and experienced staff.
v) Assumptions used in the analysis (e.g. about the environment, hardware, operating system and other interfaces) have been validated.
vi) Models or other abstractions used in the analysis are an adequate representation of the software design.
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