CAP 670 Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements 1(71)

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d) Adequately qualified and experienced staff have applied the analysis techniques.
NOTE:  Staff are deemed to be appropriately qualified and experienced if they understand the design notations, and the analysis approach, are experienced in using them and understand the required software safety requirements attributes and the system context.
e) Any tools, used in the analysis processes, have been verified and validated to an appropriate level for the impact of the tool on the software safety requirement.
f) Any tools, used to derive and/or express the software safety requirements, have been verified and validated to an appropriate level for the impact of the tool on the software safety requirement.
g) A process that is independent of the means by which the requirements were derived in the first place has demonstrated the validity of the software safety requirement.
NOTE 1:More than one notation may be used at any given requirements or design level.
NOTE 2:Following the guidance in section 6 'Requirements Satisfaction' should highlight those requirements that are unverifiable. Consequently this section and section 6 may be used to demonstrate that software safety requirements are complete, are valid and their implementation has been verified.

7  Guidance on Credible Arguments and Evidence to Demonstrate Requirements Satisfaction Relating to Objective B
7.1  General Requirements for Evidence of Requirements Satisfaction
a) Arguments and evidence should be available to show that each and every software safety requirement has been satisfied completely and correctly.
b) This guidance only considers evidence made available from the following sources: testing, field service experience or analysis.
NOTE 1:Where field service experience fails to show, or any result of the analyses and tests fails to show, that safety requirements are met, it should be regarded as evidence that the software is not safe to enter service (unless an argument with supporting evidence is available to justify the software entering service despite the assurance requirements not being met, e.g. architectural mitigation may be provided).
NOTE 2:Different sources of evidence of requirements satisfaction may be offered for different software safety requirements within a component of the application software, provided that it is valid to assess the requirements independently.
NOTE 3:The same evidence may be offered for different software safety requirements or attributes provided that it is valid to assess them collectively.
c) Arguments and evidence of software safety requirement satisfaction should comply with the generic requirements (i.e. for all attributes) of Section 7.2 and 7.3 and the attribute specific requirements of section 7.4 below.
NOTE:  It is only necessary to provide evidence of requirements satisfaction for those attributes identified as being pertinent to the software safety requirement.
d) The tables at the start of each section 7.4.1 to 7.4.7 show acceptable sources of direct evidence for each software requirement attribute and AEL. The Primary argument should be based on the source of evidence that is shown CAPITALISED in the table. Where a Secondary argument is necessary it should be based on the source of evidence shown in Lower Case. For a greater understanding of Primary and Secondary arguments refer to Appendix B.
NOTE:  Different sources of evidence may be offered for the same attribute of a software safety requirement provided that:
i)  The acceptance criteria for each source, when combined, can be shown to satisfy the acceptance criteria for the attribute,
ii)  It can be shown that the sources of evidence are independent.
The tables in section 7.4 indicate how this evidence wil be assessed. use multiple columns for a particular AEL (the value of an AEL is the row of the table).
e) Tables  1, 2 and 3 below show how evidence, that the software safety requirements have been implemented completely and correctly, can be collected to an appropriate level of rigour.
　
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