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The pilot in command’s dual sidestick inputs, although intended to assist the copilot,
compounded the handling difficulties experienced by the copilot during the latter
stages of the approach. The pilot in command’s inputs seemed to be in reaction to
concerns about the aircraft’s attitude and trajectory during the latter stages of the
approach. However, in so doing, those inputs increased the risk of the over-control of
the aircraft when in close proximity to the ground.
Had the pilot in command taken control of the aircraft in the manner specified in the
operator’s FCOM, by stating ‘I have control’ and pressing the side stick priority
pushbutton when he became concerned, the dual sidestick inputs would most likely
have been discontinued at that stage. Single-stick demand inputs to achieve the
desired aircraft attitude in terms of its pitch and/or roll would then have been
restored, and the risk of the over-control of the aircraft in close proximity with the
ground would have been reduced.
Under those circumstances, both the touchdown ‘crab’ angle and vertical 'g' loading
of 1.7 ‘g’ would probably have been less than actually occurred. As such, the MLG
– 32 –
tyre side forces during the ‘decrab’ after touchdown and the rate of MLG bogey
derotation would both have been reduced. The reduced MLG tyre groundslip angle
and loadings at touchdown would have lessened the likelihood of the resultant tyre
and aircraft damage that occurred.
– 33 –
FINDINGS
Contributing safety factors
• The A340 landed on runway 16 in significant crosswind conditions.
• The failure of the number-1 wheel tyre on the left main landing gear resulted
from a combination of high side forces, centrifugal loads, tensile compression,
and shear forces that acted on that tyre during the landing touchdown in the
prevailing crosswind conditions.
• The pilot in command, as pilot not flying (PNF), and without announcing that he
was taking control and pressing the side stick priority pushbutton, made dual
sidestick inputs during the latter stages of the landing approach to runway 16, and
continued to make those inputs after the aircraft touched down.
• The dual sidestick inputs by the pilot in command resulted in ‘global’ demand
‘orders’ that were greater than those ‘ordered’ by the copilot’s sidestick input.
• The aircraft response to the ‘global’ demand ‘orders’ was likely to have been
greater-than-expected by the copilot.
• The unexpected magnitude of the aircraft’s response to the dual pilot sidestick
inputs resulted in both crew members applying opposite stick inputs to reduce
that response, leading to an over-control of the aircraft.
Other safety factors
• The crew did not seek clarification of the wind speed and direction for their
intended landing on runway 16 which, at the time, was not the duty runway at
Melbourne Airport.
• The Melbourne Tower Aerodrome Controller (ADC) did not provide the crew
with landing information specific to runway 16.
• The Melbourne Tower ADC did not provide the crew with information about the
significant crosswind on runway 16, in accordance with the requirements of the
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) or Manual of Air Traffic Services
(MATS).
Other key findings
• The CANTY Sector Controller did not identify and/or query the inconsistency in
the wind information provided by the acting Flow Controller regarding the 9 kts
crosswind affecting runway 34.
• The crew did not identify and/or query the inconsistency in the wind information
that was passed to them by the CANTY Sector Controller regarding the 9 kts
crosswind affecting runway 34.
• The air traffic services system did not have procedures in place to ensure that
crews using a non-duty runway were provided with appropriate operational
information to assist in their timely decision-making.
– 34 –
• The crosswind encountered during the landing was less than the maximum
demonstrated landing crosswind for the A340.
• The landing gear loads remained below their design limit during the landing.
• The number-1 wheel tyre burst was not as a consequence of the actual landing
gear loads encountered during the landing.
• The flight warning system functioned correctly and activated the ‘DUAL INPUT’
synthetic voice message when the PNF made dual sidestick inputs during the
latter stages of the approach.
– 35 –
SAFETY ACTION
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