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34). That, and the crew’s high experience levels could have been expected to have
caused the crew to query the logic of the CANTY Sector Controller’s changed
crosswind advice.
Had the crew queried the reported changed crosswind affecting runway 34, and requested
an indication of the prevailing wind speed and direction at Melbourne, it could have
become evident to the crew and/or CANTY Sector Controller that the controller had
unintentionally passed on an incorrect wind report, and that there was actually a 9 kts
downwind component affecting runway 34, rather than the reported 9 kts crosswind.
Although shorter than runway 16/34, the length of duty runway 27 was suitable for a
landing at the aircraft’s landing weight of 245 tonnes. However, a landing on runway
27 would have required additional flight time and distance to position the A340 to
the east of Melbourne Airport and onto the final approach for runway 27, and to then
conduct the landing approach onto that runway. Moreover, the ground taxi distance
and time following a landing on runway 27 would have been longer than required
following a landing in either direction on runway 16/34.
Even though significant crosswind conditions existed on runway 16/34, the crew’s
decision to use runway 16 as the non-duty runway was understandable from an
– 28 –
operational point of view, particularly as the notified crosswind conditions were
within the A340’s demonstrated crosswind limits.
Crew handling of the aircraft during the approach and
landing sequence at Melbourne
During the latter stages of the landing approach, the pilot in command, who was the
pilot not flying (PNF), commenced dual sidestick control inputs. Those dual sidestick
inputs contravened the instructions relating to the operation of the aircraft’s fly-bywire
and side stick systems, which were contained in the operator’s A340 Flight
Crew Operating Manual (FCOM).
The passage of the strong westerly winds over the Box Forest area to the north-west
of Melbourne Airport would probably also have resulted in lee turbulence in the
vicinity of the touchdown zone of runway 16. That turbulence was likely to have
contributed to the aircraft’s unexpected roll deviations, including the recorded
sudden roll to the left shortly after the aircraft passed through a height of about 70 ft.
The pilot in command’s dual sidestick input at that point seemed to have been a
‘comfort’ intervention to correct the aircraft’s attitude or trajectory at that stage of
the approach.
The pilot in command’s dual sidestick interventions became more significant in
terms of stick deflection as the aircraft neared the ground, and were in mostly the
same direction as the copilot’s stick inputs. Those dual sidestick would have
provided ‘global’ electronic demand ‘orders’ to the flight control computers that
were greater than those ‘ordered’ by the copilot. Consequently, the aircraft’s
response to those ‘global’ demand ‘orders’ would likely have been greater-thanexpected
by the copilot. Moreover, the unexpected magnitude of aircraft’s response
seemed to result in both crew members applying opposite sidestick inputs to
counteract that unexpected response, leading to an over-control of the aircraft.
The investigation was unable to determine whether the copilot was aware of the pilot
in command’s dual sidestick inputs, even though they resulted in aural ‘DUAL
INPUT’ synthetic voice messages from the flight warning system (FWS). It was
likely that, during the latter stages of the approach, the copilot’s attention was
focussed on the external visual cues in order to maintain the aircraft tracking on the
extended centreline of the runway in the gusting crosswind conditions. In addition,
the copilot’s attention seemed also to have been focused on countering the
unexpected magnitude of the aircraft’s roll and pitch that resulted from the ‘global’
demand ‘orders’. The copilot’s focus on correcting the aircraft’s attitude and
trajectory, together with the numerous FWS synthetic voice messages, may have
resulted in the copilot not comprehending the significance of the aural ‘DUAL
INPUT’ warnings, and that they were a cue to the reason for the aircraft’s
unexpected handling response.
The application of two-thirds full right rudder during the landing flare increased the
yaw angle to more than that recommended by the manufacturer for a ‘…a safe
crosswind landing…’ where the crosswind component exceeded 15 to 20 kts. The
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